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Conflicts of interest pervade class action litigation. Because
of the large numbers of claims and the potential for members of
the class to be differently situated with respect to particular is-
sues, tensions among class members are common, even ubiqui-
tous.' More problematic still are conflicts between attorneys and
clients. Although present in all forms of litigation,2 attorney-
client conflicts are exacerbated in class actions due to the inabil-
ity of class representatives to monitor counsel.3 These problems
are recognized both by academic commentators and courts.' They
Stuyvesant P. and William T. III Comfort Professor of Law, New York University. I
would like to thank Michael Brody, Edward Brunet, Howard Erichson, Stephen Gillero,
Samuel Issacharoff, Richard Nagareda, David Rosenberg, Charles Silver, and participants
at The University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium on Class Action Litigation for help-
ful comments.
See, for example, Charles Silver and Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of
Plaintiff's Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceedings, 84 Va L Rev 1465, 1468 (1998)
("Conflicts of interest and associated tradeoffs among plaintiffs are an unavoidable part of
all lawsuits."); In re Painewebber Limited Partnerships Litigation, 171 FRD 104, 123 (S D
NY 1997) ("Potential conflict between class members is often a danger in large class ac-
tions.").
2 For general exposition, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement,
16 J Legal Stud 189 (1987).
3 The minimal role of the named plaintiff is stressed in John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regu-
lation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class
Action, 54 U Chi L Rev 877, 883-86 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plain-
tiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Though Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum L Rev 669, 677-79 (1986); Jonathan R.
Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Deriva-
tive Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1, 5-
6, 41-43 (1991).
See, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 Colum L Rev 1343, 1432 (1995) (stressing inadequacy of future claims
classes to monitor attorneys); Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Diminished Pro-
tection for the Class and the Case for Reform, 73 Neb L Rev 646, 651 (1994); Samuel Issa-
charoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 UC Davis L Rev 805, 828 (1997); Susan P. Koniak,
Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 Cornell L Rev
1045, 1121-22 (1995) (stating that it is not efficient to apply conflict of interest principles
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play a significant role in litigation-most famously, in the catas-
trophic failures of the global asbestos settlements, which were
derailed because of conflicts within the class and between class
counsel and their clients.6
Given the widespread recognition of the problems of conflicts
of interest in class action litigation, one might suppose that deci-
sionmakers would have developed a workable and well-
understood doctrine for assessing these problems. Surprisingly,
however, the courts have not articulated coherent principles to
guide their analysis. Conflicts of interest are principally dealt
with on a case-by-case basis, with the trial court's intuitions and
discretion supplying the standard for decision. Nor have rules of
professional responsibility made up for the deficit: ethics rules
relating to conflicts of interest are predicated on a notion of client
consent that is unworkable in the context of class litigation.7
This Article is an inquiry into the proper standard for dealing
with conflicts of interest in class actions.8 I propose a simple ap-
proach to guide analysis: a conflict of interest should be deemed
impermissible if a reasonable plaintiff, operating under a veil of
ignorance as to his or her role in the class, would refuse consent to
the arrangement. The standard proposed here can be termed a
"hypothetical consent" principle. It replaces the actual consent
in a mechanical fashion to class actions); Silver and Baker, 84 Va L Rev 1465 (cited in
note 2).
' See, for example, In re General Motors Corp Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products
Liability Litigation, 55 F3d 768, 803 (3d Cir 1995) (analyzing evidence that counsel had
failed to pursue class interests with sufficient diligence); Mendoza v United States, 623
F2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir 1980) (noting "inherent dangers of conflict" in class action litiga-
tion).
See Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591 (1997); Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp,
527 US 815 (1999).
7 See text accompanying notes 3-6. For analysis of the conflict of interest rules in
ordinary litigation settings as default rules for attorney-client contracts, see Jonathan R.
Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82
Iowa L Rev 965-1005 (1997). A default rule analysis does not work in the case of class
action conflicts because it assumes that the parties are capable of bargaining around the
rule, something that is impossible for class actions.
' There appears to be no systematic theoretical treatment of conflicts of interest in
class actions. For analyses of aspects of the topic, see, for example, Deborah Rhode, Class
Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan L Rev 1183 (1982) (addressing conflicts in institutional
reform litigation); Gregg H. Curry, Conflicts of Interest Problems for Lawyers Representing
a Class in a Class Action Lawsuit, 24 J Legal Prof 397 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 Cornell L Rev
1159, 1189-1194 (1995) (addressing settlements in the context of mass tort class actions);
Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw U L Rev 469, 502-06
(1994) (analyzing problems of client control over attorney's behavior in mass class ac-
tions); Silver and Taylor, 68 Va L Rev 1465 (cited in note 2).
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required in ordinary litigation with a thought experiment in
which consent is given or withheld under stylized conditions. By
placing the reasonable plaintiff behind a veil of ignorance as to
his or her position in the class, the hypothetical consent idea al-
lows representation to go forward even when some class members
will be relatively better off and some worse off as the case devel-
ops. I believe that this approach can provide useful guidance both
for the interpretation of counsel's duties under applicable rules of
professional responsibility, and for courts deciding whether to
certify class actions or approve class action settlements.
This Article is structured as follows: Part I demonstrates that
standard rules for addressing problems of conflict of interest do
not resolve class action issues. Part II describes and justifies the
hypothetical consent idea. Part III considers various applications
of the hypothetical consent approach to class action conflicts. Part
IV contains a brief note on the timing of a court's decision on con-
flicts. I end with a brief conclusion.
I. EXISTING APPROACHES TO CLASS ACTION CONFLICTS
Imagine that an attorney files breach of warranty actions
against a manufacturer on behalf of two consumers. Plaintiff A
purchased the product within the previous year, and Plaintiff B
purchased the product earlier. The applicable statute of limita-
tions is one year, but a discovery rule applies, under which the
statute begins to run only after a plaintiff should have discovered
the defect. In such a case, Plaintiffs A and B have a common in-
terest in establishing the elements giving rise to liability. But
only Plaintiff B, who purchased the item more than a year ago,
faces the additional burden of establishing that because the de-
fect was hidden or latent, she could not reasonably have discov-
ered it until a time less than a year from the filing of the action.
The court consolidates the two lawsuits in a single proceeding.
In such a case, the attorney would need to consider the bear-
ing of applicable rules of ethics as they pertain to representation
of multiple parties in litigation. If the attorney is practicing in a
jurisdiction that has adopted the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, she will have to comply
with Model Rule 1.7(b), which provides, in general, that a lawyer
"shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to an-
583
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other client."9 It seems probable, in the scenario just described,
that the attorney would conclude that her responsibility to one
client would be materially limited by her responsibility to the
other. Suppose, for example, that the attorney could introduce
testimony that supported the claim that the defect was hidden
but also tended to reduce damages. Such testimony could benefit
Plaintiff B's statute of limitations argument, but harm Plaintiff
A's claim to relief. Thus, it would probably be the course of pru-
dence for the attorney to conclude that the general prohibition of
Model Rule 1.7(b) applies. A similar analysis can be carried out
under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Disciplinary
Rule 5-105(A) requires a lawyer to decline proffered employment
if it is "likely to involve him in representing differing interests.""
That this prohibition applies in the scenario just described is in-
dicated by Ethical Consideration 5-15, providing that when mul-
tiple clients are involved, a lawyer should "resolve all doubts
against the propriety of the representation" and "never represent
in litigation" clients with differing interests."
Related problems of conflict of interest would be presented
when the attorney seeks to settle the cases." Suppose that the
attorney negotiates a settlement of $150,000, out of which Plain-
tiff A will receive $100,000 and Plaintiff B $50,000. Absent con-
sent by both clients, this settlement would run afoul of the aggre-
gate settlement rule, 3 which generally prohibits attorneys from
making a bulk settlement of the claims of multiple clients. The
purpose of the rule appears to be to prevent attorneys from trad-
ing off the interests of clients without their informed consent. 4 In
this sense, the aggregate settlement rule is a form of conflict of
interest regulation applied to a special and particularly problem-
atic setting.
These difficulties with multiple representation can usually be
avoided by obtaining the consent of the client. Under Model Rule
1.7(b), multiple representation can go forward if the lawyer rea-
' American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Model Rule
1.7(b).
10 Disciplinary Rule 105(a).
Ethical Consideration 5-15.
See Comment 7 to Model Rule 1.7 (providing that "[aln impermissible conflict may
exist by reason of the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement
of the claims or liabilities in question").
,3 See Model Rule 1.8(g); Disciplinary Rule 5-106.
See Charles Silver and Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settle-
ment Rule, 32 Wake Forest L Rev 733, 734-35 (1997) (criticizing the rule).
[2003:584
581] CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
sonably believes that the representation will not be adversely
affected and if "the client consents after consultation."15 The rule
goes on to specify that when undertaking the representation of
multiple clients in a single matter, "the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved.""6 To similar effect is Discipli-
nary Rule 5-105(C), which provides that a lawyer "may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent
the interest of each and if each consents to the representation
after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation
on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on be-
half of each."17 In ordinary litigation, therefore, it would be the
course of prudence, and possibly ethically required, for the lawyer
to inform each client of her representation of the other client and
the potential harm that might flow from the multiple representa-
tion, and to obtain the client's informed consent to proceed.
Issues of aggregate settlements can also be overcome by ob-
taining consent. Model Rule 1.8(g) permits aggregate settlements
if "each client consents after consultation, including disclosure of
the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of
the participation of each person in the settlement."8 Disciplinary
Rule 5-106 also allows aggregate settlements with client consent,
but requires the lawyer to include the additional disclosure of the
total amount of the settlement.19 Thus, an attorney wishing to
negotiate an aggregate settlement may do so under both the
Model Rules and the Model Code if she provides adequate disclo-
sure to the client and obtains an affirmative manifestation of
consent.
Now consider the same scenario in a class action setting. A
lawyer brings a class action on behalf of all persons in the state
who purchased an allegedly defective product. Half of the class
purchased the product within the past year; the other half pur-
chased the product more than a year ago. A one-year statute of
limitations applies, but a discovery rule may allow otherwise un-
timely claims to avoid the bar. Can the lawyer represent the
whole class, notwithstanding the fact that some class members
face a statute of limitations defense and others do not? Or sup-
" Model Rule 1.7(b).
See id.
" Disciplinary Rule 5-105(c).
" Model Rule 1.8(g).
Disciplinary Rule 5-106.
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pose that the lawyer, in a certified class, negotiates a settlement
under which plaintiffs who purchased the defective product
within a year will be entitled to one hundred dollars and those
who purchased the product more than a year before the filing of
the lawsuit will be entitled to only fifty dollars. Does this settle-
ment comport with the aggregate settlement rule?
The difficulty, from the standpoint of class action law, is that
the safety valve of client consent is missing, either to authorize
the representation of multiple plaintiffs or to justify the settle-
ment. The problem is general: class action litigation is incompati-
ble with client consent.21 In non-opt-out class actions brought un-
der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"), subsections
(b)(1) or (b)(2), the notion of consent is fictional. There is no
chance for class members to refuse the arrangement. Like it or
not, they are clients in the lawsuit and will be bound by the
judgment. Even when class members have the right to opt out, in
damages actions under Rule 23(b)(3),21 consent in the usual sense
cannot be obtained. The class action notice will rarely include a
careful disclosure of the dangers of multiple representation of the
sort contemplated in the ethics rules. Even if the notice did con-
tain such a discussion, the options available to class members are
different than those contemplated in the rules. The class action
client must take affirmative steps to opt out; if she does nothing,
she will remain in the class. Under the ethics rules, however, the
client must affirmatively manifest agreement in order for consent
to be effective; merely doing nothing is insufficient." Similarly,
21See, for example, Silver and Baker, 84 Va L Rev at 1468 (cited in note 2) ("Because
of the nonconsensual nature of class actions, client consent cannot cure conflicts.");
Palumbo v Telecommunications, Inc, 157 FRD 129, 133 (D DC 1994) (because unnamed
class members cannot waive conflicts, an attorney may face disqualification even if the
conflict could be waived in an ordinary litigation setting). This is not to say that class
actions are inevitably inconsistent with client consent: if clients were required to opt-in
rather than opt-out, consent could be obtained rather readily. Opt-in class actions do exist
in limited contexts, such as litigation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 USC § 626(b) (2000) and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USC § 216(b) (2000). And
they have been recommended for class action settlements generally. See, for example,
Mark Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem
Products Inc. v. Windsor, 59 Ohio St L J 1155, 1193-1201 (1998) (suggesting a framework
of individual consent of settlement for all class members). However, aside from the limited
contexts just mentioned, contemporary class action practice does not require opt-ins, and
thus is inconsistent with client consent as that concept is normally understood.
21 FRCP 23(b)(3).
2 Professor Menkel-Meadow attempts to reconcile class cases with the ethics rules by
arguing that consent can be inferred from silence. See Menkel-Meadow, 80 Cornell L Rev
at 1193 (cited in note 8). It is true that clients can manifest consent by a course of conduct,
but it would be unusual for a client to be deemed to have consented to a conflict of interest
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once the class action has been provisionally settled, the notice of
settlement (which in a settlement class may coincide with the
class action notice), will rarely contain the disclosures required
by the aggregate settlement rule. And even if the notice did con-
tain the necessary disclosures, the class member's option is,
again, only to reject or accept the settlement, which is not tanta-
mount to an affirmative manifestation of consent to the settle-
ment's terms.23
Accordingly, the ordinary ethics rules protecting against con-
flicts of interest cannot apply in class actions without substantial
modification. 4 Consent is the lynchpin of these rules, and consent
is impossible in class actions, either to waive conflicts or to au-
thorize aggregate settlements. 5 Applied literally, the rules would
by simply doing nothing. As Professor Menkel-Meadow recognizes, moreover, the idea that
consent can be inferred from silence is inconsistent with rules applicable in some states,
such as California, that require consent to conflicts to be in writing.
Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797 (1985), does not stand for a different
rule. In Shutts, the Court held that a state court could constitutionally exercise jurisdic-
tion over absent class members, despite the absence of minimum contacts, because of the
procedural safeguards contained in the class action procedure-most importantly, the
right to notice and to opt out of the action. Id at 811-812. Holding that notice and opt-out
rights may operate as a substitute for consent to a court's jurisdiction is not tantamount to
concluding that they can also operate as consent to a conflict of interest on the part of
class counsel.
' For judicial recognition that conflicts of interest rules cannot be simplistically ap-
plied to class actions, see, for example, In re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litiga-
tion, 317 F3d 91, 102 (2d Cir 2003) (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Liti-
gation); Lazy Oil Co v Witco Corp, 166 F3d 581, 589-90 (3d Cir 1999); Bash v Firstmark
Standard Life Insurance Co, 861 F2d 159, 161 (7th Cir 1988) (noting that "strict applica-
tion of rules on attorney conduct that were designed with simpler litigation in mind might
make the class-action device unworkable in many cases"); In re "Agent Orange" Products
Liability Litigation, 800 F2d 14, 18-19 (2d Cir 1986) (noting that "the traditional rules
that have been developed in the course of attorneys' representation of the interests of
clients outside of the class action context should not be mechanically applied to the prob-
lems that arise in the settlement of class action litigation"); In re Corn Derivatives Anti-
trust Litigation, 748 F2d 157, 163 (3d Cir 1984) (Adams concurring) (noting that "tradi-
tional model cannot be carried over unmodified to the class action arena, since no clear
allocation of decision-making responsibility has emerged between the attorney and class
members"). Academic commentators also acknowledge that class actions present special
problems. See, for example, Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judi-
cial Role, 65 Fordham L Rev 71, 127 (1996) ("The conflict rules do not appear to be drafted
with class action procedures in mind and may be at odds with the policies underlying the
class action rules."); Brian J. Waid, Ethical Problems of the Class Action Practitioner:
Continued Neglect by the Drafters of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 27
Loyola L Rev 1047, 1048-49 (1981) (noting that ethics rules provide inadequate guidance
for class actions).
' See Joshua H. Threadcraft, The Class Action Settlement: When the Good Can Be-
come the Bad and the Ugly, 25 J Legal Prof 227, 229 (2001) (noting that attorneys regu-
larly enter into settlements in class actions that "violate the letter and spirit of the [ag-
gregate settlement] rule"); Menkel-Meadow, 80 Cornell L Rev at 1189-95 (1995) (cited in
note 8); Paul D. Rheingold, Ethical Constraints on Aggregated Settlements of Mass-Tort
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seriously interfere with the conduct of class action litigation.
How, then, are conflicts of interest to be managed, and under
what standard?
A partial answer is that review by the court substitutes for
client consent. Class counsel is expected to bring conflicts to the
attention of the trial judge,26 whose approval substitutes for client
consent.27 As "fiduciaries" for absent plaintiffs,28 judges in class
actions have an affirmative duty to protect the class, not only at
key moments in the litigation such as class certification or set-
tlement approval, but always.29 An important part of that process
is the court's evaluation of whether the representation of the
class by the named plaintiff and class counsel is infected by dis-
qualifying conflicts of interest.
The court's role in policing against class action conflicts of
interest takes two principal forms.3" First, courts in class action
cases, as in all other cases, have supervisory authority over the
conduct of litigation before them, including the power to police
against conflicts of interest. Thus, courts in class action cases
may be asked to rule on motions to disqualify counsel. Second,
the court becomes involved when it rules on motions under the
applicable class action rule."' Under Federal Rule 23(a)(3), a class
may be certified only if the claims or defenses of the representa-
tive parties are "typical of the claims or defenses of the class." 2
By requiring similarity in claims and defenses, the rule filters out
cases where the representative plaintiff or class counsel have in-
Cases, 31 Loyola LA L Rev 395, 402 (1998); Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing
the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S Tex L J 149, 175-81 (2000).
One state, North Dakota, has exempted class actions from the rule. See North Dakota
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(g).
" See Pettway v American Cast Iron Pipe Co, 576 F2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir 1978)
(pointing out conflicts to the court may protect the interests of absentee class members).
1 See Menkel-Meadow, 80 Cornell L Rev at 1193 (cited in note 8).
, Reynolds v Beneficial Nat Bank, 288 F3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir 2002) (describing the
role of a trial court reviewing a proposed class action settlement as that of a "fiduciary").
See, for example, North American Acceptance v Arnall, Golden & Gregory, 593 F2d
642, 645 (5th Cir 1979) ([I]f at any time the trial court realizes that class counsel should
be disqualified, it is required to take appropriate action.").
' Another potential avenue for policing against conflicts is a petition to forfeit the
attorneys' fee. See Holocaust Litigation, 317 F3d at 102. As the result in the Holocaust
Litigation case demonstrates, however, the probability that a court would require forfei-
ture of a fee after it has been paid is very low, at least in the absence of serious and previ-
ously unknown misconduct.
" In policing against conflicts of interest, the class action rule implements values that
have a foundation in the Due Process Clause. See Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 43-45
(1940). However, the class action rule may well impose requirements that are stricter than
the barebones constitutional protections.
3 FRCP 23(a)(3).
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terests that are significantly at odds with the interests of other
class members. The commonality and predominance require-
ments" also operate as preliminary screens to ensure overlap in
the legal positions of class members, thus further reducing the
possibility of intra-class conflicts. Even more important is the
requirement that the representative plaintiff (and class counsel)
must "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 4
This adequacy of representation provision has long been under-
stood as demanding that neither the representative plaintiff nor
class counsel have interests that are in fundamental conflict with
the interests of other class members.35
Judicial review for conflicts of interests re-enters once the
action has been settled. Under Rule 23(e),36 the court must review
and approve class action settlements before they can become ef-
fective, and in so doing must determine that the proposed com-
promise is "fair, adequate and reasonable."37 For a settlement to
be "fair," it should not discriminate among class members; for it
to be "adequate," tensions within the class or between the class
and counsel should not cause the consideration received by the
class to be lower than what could otherwise be obtained.38 Accord-
ingly, class action settlements may be rejected if they are the
product of conflicted representation. 39
While the judicial role in policing against conflicts of interest
in class action litigation is thus well-established, the standards
under which that role is to be exercised are not. Courts declare
that a conflict of interest will be disqualifying if it interferes with
FRCP 23(a)(2) provides that, for a class action to be maintained, there must be
"questions of law or fact common to the class." FRCP 23(b)(3) provides that, for a class
action to be maintained under that heading, the court must find that "questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members."
FRCP 23(a)(4).
See, for example, Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 625-26 (1997); In
re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 617 F2d 22, 27 (3d Cir 1980). Judicial rulings on these
topics have important consequences. If the court finds that the representative plaintiff or
class counsel is subject to a disqualifying conflict, it will refuse to certify the class. If, on
the other hand, the court certifies the class over objections, the certification itself counts
as a finding that a disqualifying conflict was not present. Thus, if an objecting party does
not appeal the certification, he or she is likely to be held to have waived objection, and
therefore cannot succeed in a subsequent motion to disqualify. See, for example, Wininger
v SI Management LP, 301 F3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir 2002) (holding a claim of harm due to
class settlement as moot owing to parties' lack of original objection).
FRCP 23(e).
, See, for example, Joel A. v Giuliani, 218 F3d 132, 138 (2d Cir 2000).
See FRCP 23(e).
See, for example, Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 527 US 815, 856-57 (1999).
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the vigorous prosecution of the action.4 ° Alternatively, some sim-
ply require the trial court to conduct a "rigorous analysis" of
whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.41 These pro-
nouncements encourage real rather than pro forma evaluations,
but they do little to instruct trial courts on how to assess conflicts
of interest. Most cases are addressed on a case-by-case basis, with
the decision based primarily on the discretion and intuition of the
judge rather than on any well-established set of principles. 42 Of-
ten, the courts do an excellent job of sensibly protecting the class
without unduly burdening the litigation. Yet more clearly articu-
lated standards could help.
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT STANDARD
A hypothetical consent standard provides potentially valu-
able guidance in analyzing conflict of interest problems in class
action litigation. Under this standard, a conflict should be
deemed impermissible if, but only if, a reasonable plaintiff under
a veil of ignorance as to his or her position in the class would re-
fuse consent to the arrangement. Since consent from actual plain-
tiffs cannot be obtained, the concept of consent requires the crea-
tion of a hypothetical plaintiff whose decision process can fairly
be attributed to the class members as a whole.42
"o See Downs, 73 Neb L Rev at 652 (1994) (cited in note 4).
4' General Telephone Co of Southwest v Falcon, 457 US 147, 161 (1982).
"2 See, for example, In re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litigation, 2003 WL
23412, *9 (2d Cir); Lazy Oil Co v Witco Corp, 166 F3d 581, 589-90 (3d Cir 1999); Bash v
Firstmark Standard Life Insurance Co, 861 F2d 159, 161 (7th Cir 1988); "Agent Orange,"
800 F2d at 18-19; Corn Derivatives, 748 F2d at 163 (Adams concurring).
" Focusing in particular on class action settlements, Charles Silver and Lynn Baker
propose a different standard in their paper, I Cut, You Choose, 84 Va L Rev 1465 (cited in
note 2). They argue that plaintiffs' attorneys should not be subject to a strict "no conflicts"
approach, but instead should operate under a reasonableness standard such as that gov-
erning trustees. Silver and Baker's approach has some degree of overlap with the stan-
dard proposed here in that it would adopt a relatively permissive approach to conflicts of
interest in the settlement context. However, Silver's and Baker's approach appears to be
less satisfactory than the hypothetical consent standard in several respects. First, by
adopting a general "reasonableness" standard, their approach does not provide much
guidance as to how particular conflicts of interest should be resolved, and in particular
does not focus attention on the two most salient considerations: whether the conflict of
interest threatens to reduce the overall recovery for the class, and whether in light of the
risk aversion of class members, the conflict results in an undesirable deviation of individ-
ual recoveries from the actual expected values of their claims. Second, in analogizing the
role of class counsel to that of trustee, Silver's and Baker's approach does not take suffi-
cient account of the conflicts of interest between counsel and class members that pervade
class action litigation. The hypothetical consent approach, in contrast, uses the concept of
a reasonable plaintiff under a veil of ignorance to focus attention on the conflicts between
class counsel and class members.
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The decisionmaker, under this standard, is a "reasonable"
plaintiff. This idea is intended to accomplish two objectives. First,
it operates to remove idiosyncratic features that might pertain to
an individual class member in real life. For example, the reason-
able plaintiff is not opposed to or supportive of class action litiga-
tion on ideological grounds, has no attitude towards the defen-
dant based on personal history not shared by other class mem-
bers, and is not unusually risk averse or risk preferring relative
to the class. Nor is the reasonable plaintiff motivated by a desire
to have her "day in court." The potential catharsis of a trial is not
part of the reasonable plaintiff's objective function; rather, she is
willing to accept a settlement if doing so increases the value of
her stake. In filtering out individualized characteristics, the con-
cept of a reasonable plaintiff can be seen as a sort of "super-
typicality" requirement, demanding that the hypothetical deci-
sionmaker possess no unusual features not shared with the class
in general.
The idea of a reasonable plaintiff also implies that the deci-
sionmaker is motivated by rational self-interest, defined as a
wish to maximize the value of her personal stake. She will not,
for example, prefer a lower settlement to a higher one, or a later
payout to an earlier one of the same amount. The reasonable
plaintiff need not, however, be motivated solely by monetary
gain: if the members of the class could be expected to have a non-
pecuniary interest in the case-such as, for example, a reason to
desire injunctive relief against the defendant-the reasonable
plaintiff will share that interest. Similarly, especially in non-opt-
out class actions, the reasonable plaintiff may have an autonomy-
based interest, grounded in the policies of the First Amendment,
in not having an attorney purport to speak in her name in mak-
ing arguments or seeking results with which she disagrees."
Supplementing the reasonable plaintiff idea is the concept of
a veil of ignorance as to the decisionmaker's position in the
class.45 The veil of ignorance is intended to screen out knowledge
of the part of the class to which the decisionmaker belongs. This
" See Maximilian A. Grant, Comment, The Right Not to Sue: A First Amendment
Rationale for Opting Out of Mandatory Class Actions, 63 U Chi L Rev 239, 247 (1996).
Compare Wooley v Maynard, 430 US 705, 717 (1977) (holding that New Hampshire may
not require motorists to display state motto "live free or die" on their license plates).
" The concept of a veil of ignorance has an important role in philosophical explora-
tions of the conditions for moral and political legitimacy. See generally John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice (Belknap 1971) (employing a veil of ignorance to establish conditions for
legitimate consent to constitutional arrangements).
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is only a limited screen, in that all other case-related information
is available to the decisionmaker. For example, while the reason-
able plaintiff doesn't know which part of the class she belongs to,
she is fully informed of the class segments and of the differences
of interests among them. She is aware of claims and legal theo-
ries underlying the case, as well as the nature and extent of class
counsel's interest. She understands the dynamics of class action
litigation. Thus, she will know that any settlement will be re-
viewed by the trial court for fairness to the class and that she will
have the right to opt out of a 23(b)(3) class. She also knows what
sorts of remedies (if any) are available to cure a conflict of inter-
est if consent is refused. She thus has a basis for assessing the
pros and cons of granting or refusing consent to the arrange-
ment.46
In applying the hypothetical consent standard, the trial court
would take into account all properly available information and, if
necessary, hold a hearing at which the parties may present evi-
dence and make arguments. The information presented to the
court could indicate the presence of an impermissible conflict in
two ways. Some conflicts may be so egregious, in themselves, as
to establish that a reasonable plaintiff would refuse consent. If,
for example, counsel presented a settlement under which the de-
fendant provided nothing of value to the class in exchange for a
release of liability, and agreed also to pay a hefty fee to class
4 Although the concept of the veil of ignorance will ordinarily operate as a thought
experiment, it became a reality in a recent Seventh Circuit case, Uhl v Thoroughbred
Technology and Telecommunications, Inc, 309 F3d 978 (7th Cir 2002). This was a settle-
ment class action brought on behalf of thousands of owners of properties running on either
side of a railroad right-of-way, challenging a cable company's claim that it had the right to
install conduits for fiber optic cables along the right-of-way. The cables in question would
be laid on one side or the other of the tracks, and thus property owners on the side where
cable would be laid would have much stronger claims than those on the other side. The
problem for the class was that it was impossible to determine in advance of detailed sur-
veys which side of the track the cable company would select at any given point (presuma-
bly the cable could pass underneath the tracks if the company decided to switch sides). To
address this difficulty, plaintiffs' counsel divided the class into two groups, the "cable side"
and the "non-cable side." The settlement provided for different compensation for the two
groups. The case was thus settled at a time when the individual class members could not
know which group they were in. Only one representative plaintiff served for both groups.
The district court concluded that the class representative was appropriate because he was
ignorant as to which subgroup he belonged-a "concrete working example of John Rawls'
celebrated theory of the 'veil of ignorance."' Id at 986. Judge Wood, writing for the Seventh
Circuit, affirmed the district court's decision, observing that the representative plaintiff
was able to act as an effective advocate for both groups given that he did not know to
which he belonged. While the Seventh Circuit did not here adopt the hypothetical consent
standard, the spirit of the decision is consistent with the thesis of this Article.
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counsel, the court may properly conclude that the reasonable
plaintiff would object. In other cases, the evidence of conflict of
interest would not be enough to establish that a reasonable plain-
tiff would refuse consent per se, but would be enough to raise a
yellow flag indicating that the arrangements in question should
be carefully scrutinized in other respects. For example, if the
named plaintiff becomes dissatisfied with class counsel and seeks
an order substituting attorneys, this is a circumstance providing
the court with a basis to inquire further as to whether class coun-
sel is properly representing the class, but it does not, in itself,
justify a court in concluding that the reasonable plaintiff would
refuse consent.47
If, after conducting the above analysis, the judge concludes
that the reasonable plaintiff would not refuse consent to the rep-
resentation, the case can proceed as before.48 If, on the other
hand, the court concludes that the reasonable plaintiff would re-
fuse consent, the judge would enter an appropriate curative or-
der, such as requiring that the class be divided into separately
represented subclasses or (in an appropriate case) disqualifying
counsel. Where the conflict involves the size of the attorneys' fee,
the court has discretion to set an appropriate fee, either as part of
a settlement or incident to a judgment on the merits.49
In assessing whether a conflict should be deemed impermis-
sible under the hypothetical consent standard, a court would look
to the value of the relief expected for the class as a whole and to
the variance of recoveries for different class members from the
estimated fair value of their claims. If class members (and there-
fore the reasonable plaintiff) are risk neutral, only the first issue
is relevant. The reasonable plaintiff's objective function will be to
maximize the absolute value of her recovery, which implies also
maximizing the value of the aggregate recovery (since the rea-
sonable plaintiff is ignorant of her position in the class). Suppose,
for example, that in the class action described above, all class
members were similarly situated, except that half of them face a
potential statute of limitations defense. Suppose further that
counsel, acting alone, would negotiate a settlement giving one
hundred dollars to the more recent purchasers and fifty dollars to
earlier purchasers who are subject to the defense. If, however, the
' See notes 45 and 46 and accompanying text.
Consider Grossman v First Pa Corp, 1991 US Dist LEXIS 15373 (E D Pa).
See Vizcaino v Microsoft Corp, 290 F3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir 2002) (finding that
trial court has discretion to set reasonable fees for counsel).
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two parts of the class were separately represented, the respective
recoveries would be ninety dollars and fifty-five dollars." Overall,
recovery for the class would also fall with separate representation
(from an average of seventy-five dollars per class member to an
average of seventy-two dollars and fifty cents).5 In such a case,
earlier purchasers would refuse consent to unitary representation
because, by obtaining independent representation, they can each
make themselves five dollars better off. Yet such a result would
reduce the recovery for the class as a whole. When the veil of ig-
norance is introduced, the reasonable plaintiff estimates her ex-
pected recovery as the average recovery for the class. She would
agree to the unitary representation.
The court's assessment of the value of the case will often de-
pend on the available options for curing potential conflicts. In
some class actions, conflicts can be addressed inexpensively by
creating subclasses or otherwise ensuring that factions in the
class receive independent representation. The case just discussed
provides an example: the class neatly divides into two groups,
those who face a potential statute of limitations defense and
those who do not. It might be possible to split the class into sepa-
rately represented subclasses without adding much extra expense
or complexity (at least if the litigation is not far advanced). In
other cases, however, the conflict may split the class into multiple
factions. In securities fraud class actions, for example, class
members may have different interests depending on the time of
purchase, resulting in the potential for hundreds of different sub-
groups." Obviously a curative order requiring separate represen-
tation for each would be unworkable. If no less costly method for
cure is available, the optimal strategy for the class might be to
accept the unitary representation despite the presence of intra-
class tensions.
Issues as to variance of return enter when risk aversion is
introduced.53 If the class (and therefore the reasonable plaintiff) is
' The reason for the difference could be that the second attorney, representing the
earlier purchasers, fights hard for their interests and thus increases their recovery by five
dollars, albeit at the expense of the newer purchasers whose recovery falls by ten dollars.
" The introduction of a second attorney would not necessarily reduce the size of the
class recovery, however. For example, adding another attorney into the settlement nego-
tiations may function as a check on the propensity of class counsel to trade off a reduced
recovery on the merits for a larger fee. If the second attorney would increase the expected
recovery for the class, the reasonable plaintiff would prefer this arrangement.
52 See notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
,3 Concerns about risk aversion and variance of recovery can be discerned beneath the
surface of several contemporary debates on class action issues. For example, suggestions
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risk averse, then the preferable outcome might be to trade off a
reduced recovery for the class as a whole in return for a tighten-
ing of the probability distribution of individual recoveries. Sup-
pose the same facts as before: with a single attorney, late pur-
chasers get one hundred dollars and early purchasers get fifty
dollars. With separate representation, late purchasers get ninety
dollars and early purchasers get fifty-five dollars. Suppose fur-
ther that an unbiased estimate of the fair value of the claims
would be ninety-five dollars and fifty-five dollars. Although the
recovery for the class as a whole is smaller with separate repre-
sentation, the average gap between the recoveries and the esti-
mated value of the claims is reduced (from five dollars to two dol-
lars and fifty cents). The reasonable plaintiff would prefer sepa-
rate representation if she valued the reduction in risk more than
she disliked the loss in expected recovery.
How is a trial court to assess the risk aversion of the class?
Obviously, this cannot be accomplished with complete precision.
But it seems possible to sort classes according to a rough scale.
Where average damages are substantial, plaintiffs are likely to be
risk averse since they have more to lose as the stakes increase. 4
On the other hand, when the case involves only monetary relief
and the average recovery per class member is small (as is often
true in consumer class actions), risk aversion may be low because
the reasonable plaintiff will not suffer significant harm if the out-
come is unfavorable. Where the matters at issue implicate ideo-
logical or dignitary concerns-for example, a school desegregation
case-risk aversion may be higher than when such concerns are
absent. Risk aversion is also likely to be greater when the litiga-
tion can (or will) result in an outcome that would affirmatively
harm some class members. While people may not care greatly
that they do not receive as much as possible in litigation, they are
that courts should preferentially certify "mature" mass tort litigation can be understood as
reflecting the idea that as judges develop experience with categories of litigation, it be-
comes more feasible to devise a global class action settlement in which recoveries to indi-
vidual class members are reasonably correlated with the actual strength of their claims.
Consider Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 BU L Rev 659,
688 (1989). Concerns about ensuring a reasonable link between settlement recovery and a
reasonable estimate of class members' damages may also be reflected in the Supreme
Court's focus in Amchem on the factual differences among the members of the settlement
class. See Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 622-25 (1997) (refusing to certify
a class of plaintiffs including those exposed to asbestos, as well as their spouses and fami-
lies).
" See Warren Schwartz, Long-Shot Class Actions: Toward a Normative Theory of
Uncertainty, 8 Legal Theory 297, 299 (2002).
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likely to object when they end up worse off than before, especially
when other members of the class end up better off.
The tradeoff between recovery and variance is related to the
size of the case. In very large cases, the reasonable plaintiff may
decline consent to conflicted representation because any loss in
expected recovery per plaintiff resulting from the addition of new
counsel may be relatively small, while the reduction of risk may
be substantial. In small cases, on the other hand, these economies
may be absent and the costs of separate representation (or other
curative orders) may exceed the benefits in terms of reducing
risk.
The hypothetical consent standard is supported by several
justifications. First, it emulates the actual consent required in
ordinary litigation. Because actual consent is impossible, we can
mimic the requirement if we ask whether a reasonable plaintiff
under a veil of ignorance as to her position in the class would
consent to the arrangement. The hypothetical consent standard
aligns class action practice with the requirements applicable in
other settings, thus serving the client-protective policies underly-
ing the conflicts rules.
Second, the hypothetical consent standard generates efficient
outcomes. Because of the veil of ignorance criterion, the reason-
able plaintiff's objective, in the absence of risk aversion, is to
maximize the recovery for the class. When risk aversion is intro-
duced, the reasonable plaintiff is no longer committed to maxi-
mizing class recovery, but still wants to maximize expected utility
for the class. Other things equal, a decision standard that maxi-
mizes class benefits appears to have a strong claim for adoption.
Third, the hypothetical consent standard does not unduly
hamstring class action litigation.55 If the reasonable plaintiff were
informed of her position in the class she would decide only accord-
ing to her own interests and not take others into account. Obvi-
ously this could generate undesirable results. But because the
reasonable plaintiff is shielded from knowledge of her position,
the hypothetical consent standard requires that the decision be in
the best interest of the class as a whole-and thus would allow
representation to go forward even if some individual class mem-
bers would object.
' In this respect, the hypothetical consent idea provides content to Professor Green's
intuition that class action conflicts might be treated more leniently than conflicts in other
settings. See Green, 65 Fordham L Rev at 126 (cited in note 24).
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Finally, the hypothetical consent standard recognizes the
reality that most class action litigation is dominated by class
counsel rather than by the representative plaintiffs." In ordinary
litigation settings, the principal concern is the problem of client-
client conflicts. The worry is that the attorney's loyalty to one cli-
ent will compromise her representation of another client. In class
actions, on the other hand, the problem of client-client conflicts,
while not absent, is reduced because class members-even repre-
sentative plaintiffs--do not exercise significant control over class
counsel's conduct of the litigation. Conflicts among absent class
members, or even between the named plaintiff and other mem-
bers of the class, will not in themselves create severe difficulties.
For the same reason, however, concerns about attorney-client con-
flicts of interest are heightened. The hypothetical consent test
addresses this reality of class action practice. By removing con-
sideration of the particular circumstances of the reasonable
plaintiff vis-A-vis other class members, the test downplays intra-
class conflicts. While such conflicts may require judicial correc-
tion under the hypothetical consent standard, the veil of igno-
rance would immunize many from attack. On the other hand, the
veil of ignorance does not disguise from the reasonable plaintiff
the relationship between counsel's interests and the interests of
the class. Thus, the reasonable plaintiff will be relatively more
concerned about attorney-client conflicts, and relatively less con-
cerned about client-client conflicts.
III. APPLICATION OF THE HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT STANDARD
Class action conflicts can be analyzed according to the type of
conflict involved. 7 Every class action case presents three relevant
parties whose interests must be considered: the representative
See Macey and Miller, 58 U Chi L Rev at 3 (cited in note 3) ("absence of client moni-
toring" of class counsel); Downs, 73 Neb L Rev at 650 (cited in note 4) ("steadily diminish-
ing role of the class representative"). This observation may have somewhat less force in
litigation under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-67,
109 Stat 737 (codified in sections of 15 USC §§ 77, 78), which encourages a more active
role for representative plaintiffs.
"' Because of the complex structure of class action litigation and the wide variety of
cases that can be structured as class actions, the number of categories is fairly substan-
tial. And the categories used to describe the conflicts are often not exclusive: a given case
can present a variety of different types of conflict. The analysis in each category, more-
over, depends on case-specific facts and circumstances. It is not possible, therefore, to
provide definite answers as to how the hypothetical consent test would apply in many
cases. Nevertheless, it may be useful to set out a typology of conflicts and to offer prelimi-
nary thoughts.
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plaintiff, class counsel, and absent class members. Most conflict
of interest situations can be analyzed as falling into one of the six
categories that are generated when these parties are placed in
bipolar opposition. For each of the categories, further, the conflict
could be either a difference of opinion (the parties disagree about
the best way to conduct or settle the litigation) or a difference of
interest (increasing a benefit to one group can reduce the benefit
available to the other). The discussion below addresses some of
these permutations, organized according to the identities of the
parties whose interests or opinions are in conflict.
A. Absent Class Members Versus Absent Class Members
In ordinary litigation, the classic conflict of interest situation
is the case in which the interests of one client clash with those of
another (present or former) client. The analogy to this problem, in
class action cases, is the intra-class conflict where the interests of
some class members differ from the interests of others. How are
these problems analyzed under the hypothetical consent stan-
dard?
Several observations are pertinent at the outset. First, be-
cause by definition absent class members will not be before the
court, the issues are conflicts of interest rather than conflicts of
opinion. Other things equal, it would appear that conflicts of in-
terest present more serious problems than conflicts of opinion. A
reasonable plaintiff would be expected to care more about the
amount she will recover from the case than she cares about the
difference of opinion regarding how the case should be litigated.
To this extent, it might seem appropriate to adopt a relatively
strict approach to intra-class conflicts. On the other hand, not all
intra-class conflicts are impermissible. For example, most class
members presumably wish to receive as much as possible from
the case, and thus have an interest in appropriating more for
themselves and leaving less for others.58 If this were a disabling
conflict, then class action litigation could not exist. Something
more than the wish to obtain more than one's fair share must be
present. For a conflict to be impermissible, it must threaten ei-
ther (or both) of the goals we have attributed to the reasonable
plaintiff. maximizing the amount of recovery for the class, and
See, for example, Curtiss-Wright Corp v Helfand, 687 F2d 171, 175 (7th Cir 1982)
("[W]hen a district judge approves a class action settlement.., he almost always overrides
the wishes of some class members for a bigger share of the pie.").
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reducing the variance of outcomes relative to a fair estimate of
claim value. Intra-class conflicts display a spectrum of severity,
depending on how much they impair these objectives.
1. Spurious conflicts.
Some differences among class members pose no serious
threat either to maximizing recovery or to reducing variance, and
therefore can be classed as spurious conflicts. The most obvious
example is when the class consists of persons who expect to re-
ceive different amounts from the case because of differences in
their claims, but where the relief is a fair approximation of claim
value and where providing relief for one class member has no ef-
fect on the relief available to other class members. Differences of
this sort are ubiquitous in class actions. They present no conflict,
however, because class counsel is not required to trade off the
interest of one plaintiff against the interests of others. Not sur-
prisingly, courts do not disqualify counsel or require other correc-
tive actions in this setting.59 The hypothetical consent standard
supports such a result. Nothing here raises questions about coun-
sel's loyalty or desire to maximize recovery for the class. The veil
of ignorance condition excludes considerations of a wish for a
greater share of the recovery vis-A-vis other class members. Be-
cause the reasonable plaintiff does not know her position in the
class, she has no reason to refuse consent to the representation.
Also presenting spurious conflicts are cases where different
segments of the class have claims requiring different proof, but
where the issues on which the proof requirements differ are con-
sistent. For example, in In re Regal Communications Corporation
Securities Litigation,0 counsel sought to represent a class com-
posed of people who had sold the company's stock and people who
had sold its debentures. The causes of action available to the de-
benture holders did not require proof of scienter and permitted
rescission. Stock plaintiffs, however, would be required to prove
scienter and did not have a rescission remedy. The debenture
plaintiffs had no interest in proving scienter, and the stock plain-
tiffs had no benefit from seeking rescission. Notwithstanding
these differences, the trial court had no difficulty concluding that
" See, for example, Schwartz v Citibank South Dakota, NA, 50 Fed Appx 832, 836
(9th Cir 2002) (noting that differences in damages did not preclude certification); Petrovic
v Amoco, 200 F3d 1140, 1147 (8th Cir 1999) (same); Pyke v Cuomo, 209 FRD 33, 43 (N D
NY 2002) (same).
6 1995 US Dist LEXIS 13492 (E D Pa).
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certification was appropriate." This appears to be a correct result
under the hypothetical consent standard. There was no evidence
that the attorneys had any personal conflict of interest threaten-
ing their incentive to maximize class recovery. Although counsel
had to make different legal arguments and meet different eviden-
tiary burdens for the two class segments, the positions of these
groups were not in conflict. Recovery by the debenture sellers on
a rescission theory would not threaten the ability of the stock
sellers to recover under a damages theory, and proof of scienter
by the stock sellers would not harm the debenture holders.
In other cases involving differences in proof, courts reach less
defensible results. In Culver v City of Milwaukee,62 counsel
brought a putative class action on behalf of European-American
men who claimed to have been discriminated against in hiring by
the Milwaukee Police Department. Some members of the class
had allegedly been denied the chance to apply for a job at all.
Others had managed to apply, but claimed they were rejected
because the city had doctored the test results. The court of ap-
peals indicated that these two groups could not be brought to-
gether as a single class. The court noted, inter alia, that those
who had taken the test would be required to prove that the scor-
ing was discriminatory, whereas those who had been denied the
right to take the test would not face this hurdle." The hypotheti-
cal consent approach would not support this reasoning as a suffi-
cient ground for the reasonable plaintiff to refuse consent. The
mere fact that different proof was required to establish the claims
of the two subgroups did not raise serious questions as to coun-
sel's incentives to maximize recovery for the class and accurately
allocate the proceeds. Although remediation of the particular con-
flict would have been relatively easy-divide the class into sepa-
rately represented subclasses-it is far from clear that such
remediation was desirable. It appears that a difference in the
class bemused the court into concluding, incorrectly, that the dif-
ference was disqualifying.64
Id at *25-26.
277 F3d 908 (7th Cir 2002).
Id at 911.
For employment cases with similar analyses, see General Telephone Co v Falcon,
457 US 147, 159 n 15 (1982) (holding that class alleging employment discrimination could
not be certified because it included both persons who had not been hired and others who
had been hired but claimed discrimination on the job); Majeske v City of Chicago, 740 F
Supp 1350, 1357 (N D Ill 1990) (ordering separate representation of class members who
had been permitted to take an oral examination and those who had not).
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Another common example of a spurious conflict is the case
where some class members will receive damages and others equi-
table relief, but where the differences in relief are justifiable in
light of the legal positions of the parties. An example is Schwartz
v Citibank (South Dakota),65 challenging certain charges assessed
by a credit card issuer. Some card members had actually paid the
charges while others had merely been exposed to an enhanced
potential for being billed. The settlement provided cash relief to
persons who had paid the charges and equitable relief to the class
as a whole. The Ninth Circuit held that the difference in relief
was not disqualifying because all class members had a similar
interest in obtaining a change in the bank's policies.66 This is
clearly a correct result under the hypothetical consent theory,
since the mere award of different types of relief threatened nei-
ther to reduce the size of the overall recovery nor to increase the
variance of individual recoveries.
2. Recoveries with random error.
A second category of conflicts are settlements that include an
administrable but imperfectly specified schedule of recoveries for
class members. Reynolds v Beneficial National Bank" provides an
example. In Reynolds, counsel challenged tax refund anticipation
loans written by a bank in connection with tax services rendered
by H&R Block, the tax preparation firm. The settlement ap-
proved by the district court provided for payments of fifteen dol-
lars for class members who had taken out two or fewer loans and
thirty dollars for class members who had taken out more than
two loans. This structure created an "unremarked conflict of in-
terest" because class members would receive no more than thirty
dollars, whether they had taken out three loans or twenty.8 The
hypothetical consent standard would, in general, support the le-
gitimacy of this sort of settlement. In large-scale litigation with
small stakes, it is often desirable to structure relief "off the rack"
rather than individually tailor the damages to each class mem-
ber's claim. 9 This approach can conserve on the administrative
costs of the settlement, thus generating value that can be shared
50 Fed Appx 832 (9th Cir 2002).
Id at 835.
288 F3d 277 (7th Cir 2002).
Id at 282.
See Silver and Baker, 84 Va L Rev at 1480-83 (cited in note 1) (discussing averag-
ing techniques in class action settlement).
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with the class. The reasonable plaintiff would have reason to
support this approach insofar as it increased the size of the class
recovery. At the same time, because the individual stakes are
usually small in off-the-rack settlements, risk aversion should not
be a significant factor. The reasonable plaintiff would not ordi-
narily care very much about the possibility that she would be
overcompensated or under compensated by the settlement so long
as the possibilities of being in one set or the other were random.
Finally, it will be difficult for a court to formulate a curative or-
der when the differences within the class are either continuous or
discrete but large in number. In Reynolds, for example, it would
have been bizarre to create subclasses for each transaction fre-
quency; without doing this, however, it might have been difficult
to eliminate the problem. These considerations influenced Judge
Posner, in Reynolds, to conclude that the intra-class conflict was
not a fatal defect of the settlement (although the court rejected
the settlement for other reasons).' °
3. Zero-sum cases.
Some class actions involve a zero-sum feature, in that what is
given to one subset of the class will necessarily be taken away
from another. 1 In such cases, the groups share a common interest
in establishing liability, but differ sharply as to how the proceeds
of the litigation will be allocated. Unlike the former cases, where
recoveries of class members are not co-dependent, here an in-
crease in recovery by one segment of the class will reduce the
amount obtained by others.
An example arises in securities fraud litigation, where class
members are often differently situated with respect to when they
purchased or sold the securities in question." Suppose, for exam-
ple, that an issuing firm drives up its share price by releasing
Reynolds, 288 F3d at 286.
, In an abstract sense, all class actions pose some form of zero-sum problem: settle-
ment is always an option when a class action is filed, and settlement will only be possible
if is at or below the defendant's reservation price (the highest amount the defendant
would pay in settlement). An inevitable aspect of any settlement is the task of allocating
the limited proceeds among class members. I reserve the term "zero-sum" for cases involv-
ing a more concrete and direct trade-off in recoveries among class segments, under which
any increase for one will result in a decrease for another and where the "allocation di-
lemma" becomes a paramount concern. See Hanlon v Chrysler Corp, 150 F3d 1011, 1021
(9th Cir 1998) (distinguishing zero-sum cases).
72 See, for example, In re Seagate Technology II Securities Litigation, 843 F Supp 1341
(N D Cal 1994).
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misleading statements to the market. As the truth emerges the
stock falls back to (or below) the previous price. A class action for
securities fraud is filed on behalf of persons who purchased dur-
ing the period of price inflation. In this situation there will be
conflicts between class members who purchased stock on any day
when the price inflation was present and other class members
who previously purchased the stock during the class period and
who later sold their stock on the day of the other class members'
purchases. Those who bought on that day will want to maximize
the amount of price inflation remaining in the stock, since this
will give them the greatest damages." Those who sold stock on a
given day will want to minimize the amount of price inflation re-
maining in the stock price on that day, since this will maximize
the amount of their losses that can be attributed to the defen-
dant's fraud (as opposed to other factors such as general market
movements or company-specific changes in price unrelated to the
fraud). Most courts refuse to recognize a disabling conflict of in-
terest here on the grounds that the alleged harm is too specula-
tive,"4 not sufficiently substantial,75 or not dispositive because the
issue relates to damages rather than liability."6 However, other
courts have raised questions about the certifiability of such
77
cases.
Consistent with the majority of the decided cases, the hypo-
thetical consent analysis would not generally view conflicts of
this sort as disabling. The reasonable plaintiff has no reason to
doubt counsel's incentive to maximize the recovery for the class
as a whole. Because the question is one of proof, moreover, the
facts themselves have a disciplining effect against any propensity
" See, for example, In re Gaming Lottery Securities Litigation, 58 F Supp 2d 62, 69 (S
D NY 1999) (rejecting the reasoning of Seagate).
See, for example, Walsh v Chittenden Corp, 798 F Supp 1043, 1054 (D Vt 1992);
Rosen v Fidelity Fixed Income Trust, 169 FRD 295, 300 (E D Pa 1995).
71 See, for example, Jenson v Continental Financial Corp, 404 F Supp 806, 811 (D
Minn 1975) (finding that although parties purchased different types of coins this differ-
ence was not disabling).
" See In Re Regal Communications Corporation Securities Litigation, 1995 US Dist
LEXIS 13492, *15 (E D Pa) ("possibility of a unique defense does not foreclose class certifi-
cation").
" See In re Seagate Technology If Securities Litigation, 843 F Supp at 1345; In re
California Micro Devices, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 11587, *6-7 (N D Cal); In re Clearly Cana-
dian, 875 F Supp 1410, 1422 (N D Cal 1995). One interesting decision in the Northern
District of Illinois recognizes that there is a real conflict between buy and sell plaintiffs,
but holds that the policies underlying the private cause of action under the securities laws
trump the policies underlying the adequacy-of-representation requirement under the
federal class action rule. Ziemack v Centel Corp, 164 FRD 477, 482 (N D Ill 1995).
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of counsel to favor the interests of one group over another. Risk
aversion will also usually be low: although some class members
will have made large purchases during the class period, many
will be small purchasers with modest stakes. Most large purchas-
ers will be institutional investors with diversified portfolios. And
in such cases the court lacks the capacity to craft an effective
curative order because of the discrete but multiple conflicts in-
volved.
Generic drug litigation provides another example of a zero-
sum conflict. In such cases, both consumers and third-party pay-
ers typically seek compensation from the manufacturer of the
brand name medication.78 The hypothetical consent approach
suggests the following. First, the presence of the two groups of
plaintiffs provides no reason to doubt counsel's incentive to
maximize recovery for the class as a whole-a consideration that,
taken alone, would suggest that the reasonable plaintiff would
consent to unitary representation. The relatively small stakes for
most consumer class members could indicate that risk aversion is
relatively low, again suggesting that consent would be given. On
the other hand, if there is evidence that third-party payers might
influence class counsel, the possibility of inadequate compensa-
tion for consumers could tilt the balance against unitary repre-
sentation. The key factor would appear to be whether there are
indications that class counsel is too closely aligned with the third-
party payers.
A related zero-sum situation arises when class counsel brings
both derivative and direct cases based on the same nucleus of
operative fact. As counsel for the derivative shareholder, the at-
torney is charged with obtaining the largest possible recovery for
the company, whereas acting as counsel for the class, the attor-
ney's responsibility is to obtain the greatest recovery for the indi-
vidual plaintiffs. This dual role could divide class members in
several ways. Plaintiffs who sold their shares would get no bene-
fit from a recovery to the corporation, whereas those who held
would benefit from a derivative recovery because their stock may
become more valuable as a result of the payment into the corpo-
rate treasury. Plaintiffs who need liquidity would benefit from a
" See, for example, In Re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, 2002 US Dist LEXIS
16375, *54 (D Del) (overpaying for blood clotting treatment due to misrepresentation); In
re Synthroid Marketing Litigation, 188 FRD 295, 297-98 (N D Ill 1999) (consumer class
certification); In re Synthroid Marketing Litigation, 188 FRD 287, 289-90 (N D Ill 1999)
(third party payer class certification).
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class recovery (since they receive a check in the mail), whereas
those who are not liquidity-constrained might be happier with a
recovery for the corporation. Plaintiffs who happen to be creditors
of the corporation would benefit from a derivative remedy be-
cause the amounts recovered would be available to pay the firm's
debts; non-creditor plaintiffs would gain no benefit from increas-
ing creditor security. The case law on this problem is unsettled:
some courts indicate nearly blanket disapproval of representation
by a single counsel,79 others voice concerns but do not preclude
the practice," and still others adopt a permissive attitude that
allows the representation of both derivative and direct claims
unless good reasons to the contrary are shown.81
The hypothetical consent approach suggests the following.
Class counsel in such cases ordinarily has an unconflicted incen-
tive to obtain the greatest possible recovery from the defendants.
And plaintiffs would not appear to be risk averse with respect to
error in outcomes. Although a curative order would be relatively
straightforward-a ruling prohibiting the attorney from prosecut-
ing both the direct and derivative actions--disqualifications of
counsel always carry costs, and the routine availability of such
orders might deter litigation that is beneficial to the class. Thus,
unless bankruptcy of the corporation is a significant possibility,
the hypothetical consent approach would generally permit coun-
sel to prosecute both class and derivative cases.
Zero-sum problems are also raised when some class members
leave while others retain an interest in the subject matter of the
litigation. In re Cendant Corporation Litigation" provides an ex-
ample. The plaintiffs were shareholders who claimed that defen-
dants had given false information to the market that artificially
boosted the company's stock price. The class contained a hidden
" See, for example, Kamerman v Steinberg, 113 FRD 511, 515-16 (S D NY 1986);
Stull v Baker, 410 F Supp 1326, 1336-37 (S D NY 1976); Hawk Industries, Inc v Bausch &
Lomb, Inc, 59 FRD 619, 623-24 (S D NY 1973).
See In re Pacific Enterprises Securities Litigation, 47 F3d 373, 378 (9th Cir 1995)
(expressing doubts about the Milberg Weiss firm representing both direct and derivative
plaintiffs, but declining to rule because the issue had not been raised below); Brickman v
Tyco Toys, Inc, 731 F Supp 101, 108-09 (S D NY 1990) (requiring analysis of whether
conflicts are likely to materialize).
" See, for example, In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 455 F Supp
999, 1014 (N D 1ll 1978) ("It is well-settled that shareholders have the right to bring direct
and derivative actions simultaneously."); Bertozzi v King Louie Int, Inc, 420 F Supp 1166,
1179-80 (D RI 1976) (holding that dual role in such cases is not a per se conflict of inter-
est).
8 264 F3d 201 (3rd Cir 2001).
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conflict. On one side were the plaintiffs who had sold all their
stock and wanted only the greatest possible recovery-even to the
point of bankrupting the company. On the other side were the
plaintiffs who sold only some of their stock, and whose interest
included both a large recovery and a future claim on the income
stream of the company. The court hinted that such conflicts, if
brought to the attention of the trial court, might require the for-
mation of subclasses to deal with the conflicting interests of the
different class members. 3 The scenario presented in the Cendant
case is only one of many in which some members of the class
leave and others remain. The general pattern can also be found
when some members of the class wish to retain an investment
and others wish to accept a buyout offer sweetened by the class
action settlement;84 when some members of a class seeking en-
hanced pension benefits have already retired and others are cur-
rent employees whose contributions may increase to cover the
settlement costs;85 when an employment discrimination class in-
cludes both present and former employees;" when false state-
ments are made by the management of an acquisition target and
some class members become shareholders of the acquiring firm;"
when a class action against an insurance company includes both
persons who are insured but no longer paying premiums and per-
sons who are currently paying premiums which may raise to
cover the increased costs;88 or when, in a class action against a
franchisor, some franchisees have left the relationship and others
have remained.
The hypothetical consent approach does not generate general
conclusions about these cases. There is no reason to suppose that
the differences in the class are in themselves a basis to suspect
counsel's incentives to litigate the case to maximize overall recov-
ery. This factor would count in favor of the reasonable plaintiff
Id at 244 (calling conflicts to the attention of lower courts).
See City Partnership Co v Atlantic Acquisition Limited Partnership, 100 F3d 1041,
1044 (1st Cir 1996) (involving a disagreement among limited partners).
See, for example, Probe v State Teachers' Retirement System, 780 F2d 776, 781 (9th
Cir 1986); Gruby v Brady, 838 F Supp 820, 826-27 (S D NY 1993).
See, for example, Weigmann v Glorious Food, Inc, 169 FRD 280, 286 (S D NY 1996).
17 See Ziemack v Centel Corporation, 164 FRD 477, 478 (N D Ill 1995) ("Why would
these shareholders, in effect, have an interest in suing themselves?").
Caranci v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 14801,
*49-50 (D RI); Becher v Long Island Lighting Co, 164 FRD 144, 152 (E D NY 1996).
' See Broussard v Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc, 155 F3d 331, 338-39 (4th Cir
1998) (finding that present and former franchisees of muffler shops have sufficiently "di-
vergent aims").
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consenting to the representation. On the other hand, the reme-
dial options available to the trial court may count against con-
sent. Because it is easy to distinguish between class members
who stay and those who leave, it is usually simple to subdivide
the class and require separate representation for the two groups
(although the cost of requiring separate representation is not in-
substantial and will increase as the case progresses). Risk aver-
sion is likely to be more of a factor in some cases than in others.
For example, in the franchise situation, the economic interest of
franchisees in their businesses, and the importance of relations
with the franchisor for those who remain, could tip the scales in
favor of denial of consent because class members are risk averse
against variance in outcomes. In other cases-for example, those
involving insurance premiums-risk aversion might not provide a
compelling reason for refusing consent because the prospect of a
slight increase in premiums may not be a particular concern for
class members. Securities cases such as Cendant also appear low
on the risk aversion scale, suggesting doubt about the correctness
of the Third Circuit's suggestion that conflicts in such cases
should be disqualifying.
Difficult problems with zero-sum cases arise in the context of
"public interest" litigation brought on behalf of classes with sig-
nificant internal differences. In such cases, class counsel may be
led by a belief in the value of the cause to ignore differences
within the proposed class.9 ° The trend in public interest litigation
has been towards "super-classes" containing parties with a broad
range of interests and injuries." The hypothetical consent ap-
proach suggests the need for caution here. Because the expected
relief is primarily injunctive, there is no easy way to determine
what relief would maximize value for the class. Plaintiffs' attor-
neys are typically compensated by a fee-shifting statute that does
not provide strong incentives to maximize class recovery.2 Risk
'o See Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Jurisprudence and Public Interest Law,
25 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 487, 521 (1999).
" For example, child welfare advocacy groups have begun to file class actions on
behalf of children receiving or in need of a broad range of state services. See, for example,
J.B. v Valdez, 186 F3d 1280, 1283 (10th Cir 1999) (seeking reform of New Mexico's system
for the mentally disabled); Marisol A v Giuliani, 126 F3d 372, 375 (2d Cir 1997) (alleging
deprivation of child welfare services); Baby Neal v Casey, 43 F3d 48, 52 (3d Cir 1994)
(challenging state actions which allegedly jeopardized child welfare).
' Fee-shifting statutes use the "lodestar" method for calculating fees, which is not
directly tied to the size of the class recovery (although good results may enhance the lode-
star fee). For a general discussion, see City of Burlington v Dague, 505 US 557, 562 (1992)
(discussing lodestar method and appropriate reasons for enhancing the basic fee). In con-
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aversion is likely to be strong because of the fundamental inter-
ests involved. Curative orders can be crafted relatively easily be-
cause the conflicts in question often divide the class into a small
number of factions. The relevant considerations may thus counsel
for withholding consent to unitary representation, although each
case would need to be evaluated in light of the individual facts
and circumstances.
4. Present versus future claimants.
Asbestos litigation has focused attention on the conflict be-
tween present claimants and future claimants. Present claimants
have been exposed to a harmful agent and suffered an identifi-
able impairment of functioning, while future claimants have been
exposed to the agent but suffer no present impairment. In Am-
chem Products, Inc v Windsor,3 the Supreme Court seemed to
indicate that conflicts of this sort are per se disqualifying because
of the differing interests in relief: current claimants want large
compensation now, while future claimants want a generous, in-
flation-protected fund to pay their claims if illness strikes.94 This
view has received support from influential commentators,95 and
has led to a perception that present and future claimants must
automatically receive separate representation to satisfy the ade-
quacy of representation requirement.96
trast, the percent-of-recovery method, frequently used in antitrust, mass tort, and con-
sumer class actions, ties counsel's remuneration directly to the amount obtained for the
class. See Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70
Tex L Rev 865, 869 (1992) (proposing a new fee procedure based on market values).
9' 521 US 591 (1997).
See id at 626.
See, for example, Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1445 (cited in note 4) (separate sub-
classes for present and future claimants are a "necessary procedural innovation"); Koniak,
80 Cornell L Rev at 1156 (cited in note 4) (urging that subclasses could be mandatory in
certain situations); Threadcraft, 25 J Legal Prof at 232 (cited in note 25) (stressing un-
manageable aspects of large class actions); Brian Wolfman and Alan B. Morrison, Repre-
senting the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 NYU L Rev 439,
477-507 (1996) (advocating a change in class action rules mandating subclasses).
' But see Samuel Issacharoff, "Shocked": Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litiga-
tion After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 Tex L Rev 1925, 1939 (2002) (expressing skepticism
about the value of Amchem insofar as it removed the class action mechanism from the
"available tools to manage claims resolution and cash flow"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Futures Problem, 148 U Pa L Rev 1901, 1910 (2000) (identifying problems for resolution of
mass torts in the wake of Amchem); George Rutherglen, Future Claims in Mass Tort
Cases: Deterrence, Compensation and Necessity, 88 Va L Rev 1989, 1990 (2002) (observing
that "fastidious concern with the rights of future claimants might leave most of them
worse off than [under] a system of less precise but more effective remedies").
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However, the argument against including present and future
claims in a single class is far from clearcut. Courts regularly
combine such claims without giving the matter a second thought.
For example, settlements of class actions for damages often in-
clude relief under which the defendant promises not to continue
the challenged conduct. In such cases, members of the class who
expect to use the defendant's product or services will be, in effect,
future as well as present claimants. Their relief, qua future
claimants, is the defendant's promise to change its behavior.
Other members of the class who do not expect to use the defen-
dant's product or services are present claimants only. This situa-
tion may be distinguished from that at issue in Amchem because
the future claimants are before the court as present claimants.
But this is not always the case. For example, some consumer
class actions provide relief to persons who purchased a poten-
tially defective product but who have experienced no difficulties
with its use." These are pure "futures" claims, but courts have no
problem including them with "present" claims of currently in-
jured consumers.
In the absence of special circumstances, there is little reason
to suppose that class counsel should display any particular pref-
erence for present claimants over future claimants. If the attor-
ney's fee is based on a percentage of the total class recovery,
counsel will have an incentive to maximize the joint payoff for all
class members. It is true that present claimants are people who
are experiencing current harm affecting their pocketbooks or
physical functioning, whereas future claimants know only that
they might experience harm in the future: there is a difference
between "the holder of a lottery ticket [and] the winner of a lot-
tery."98 But if an appropriate estimate is used to calculate the
number and extent of future claims, this difference does not cre-
ate insurmountable tensions within the class.
Critics of combining present and future claims in a single
class often present the future claimants as uniquely vulnerable,
and therefore in need of special protection. The source of this vul-
' The recent proposed settlement in the AIWA Mini-Systems case provides an
example. AIWA CD Mini-System Settlement, available online at <httpJ/www.mini
systemsettlement.comnotice.php3> (visited Jan 13, 2003). The claim was brought on
behalf of all purchasers of certain audio systems on the ground that the CD player did not
always operate properly. Although only some class members had experienced problems,
the settlement provided relief for all purchasers, even those whose systems were operating
properly. See id at 1-3.
Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1435 (cited in note 4).
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nerability is not entirely clear, however. It might be argued that,
because proper awards for future claimants are difficult to esti-
mate,99 present claimants may take advantage of this fact to favor
their own interests over those of future claimants. But, in the
absence of special reasons that class counsel might want to favor
present over future claimants, there is no reason to suppose that
the uncertainty of future claims would lead to their expropria-
tion. Uncertainty could work in the opposite direction, resulting
in a fund that overcompensates future claimants vis-A-vis present
ones. Perhaps future claimants are more vulnerable because they
are not likely to be present in court. But class members do not
control class actions. It is attorneys who are present and who con-
trol the litigation. Unless the attorney systematically favors pre-
sent over future claimants, the greater interest that present
claimants may take in the litigation may not have much impact.
Inflation risk might provide another reason for concern. If
the settlement provides for payments as harm manifests and if
the income stream is not adjusted for inflation, the settlement
may provide inadequate compensation for future claimants. This
was one of the features that the Supreme Court found objection-
able in Amchem. °° However, although the applicable discount
rate is inevitably an issue between present and future claimants,
this is hardly an insoluble conflict. The issue is familiar in legal
practice. Trustees are not disabled from acting as fiduciaries for
current and future interests, notwithstanding the presence of the
same problem.' °  The solution is for the settling parties to adopt a
reasonable interest rate-not zero, as was the case in Amchem-
but some commercially reasonable rate for income streams of
analogous characteristics.' In short, there appears to be nothing
See id at 1430.
See Amchem, 521 US at 626.
See Uniform Principal and Income Act § 103(b), Pub L No 101-605, 7B ULA 3 (Supp
2002) (providing, in pertinent part, that "a fiduciary shall administer a trust or estate
impartially, based on what is fair and reasonable to all of the beneficiaries").
" While critics of the Amchem settlement perceive hostility to future claimants in the
failure to adjust future payments for inflation, this decision may have been based on more
straightforward considerations. If the future income stream had been discounted for infla-
tion, the gross amounts generated by the settlement would have been reduced, thus in-
creasing the requested fees as a percentage of the total settlement value. By avoiding an
inflation adjustment, counsel could make their fee request seem more reasonable. The
relevant conflict, in other words, might have been between class counsel and the class as a
whole rather than between two subsets of the class. Further, counsel's motivation to exag-
gerate the value of the settlement does not always work to the disadvantage of future
claimants. Since the number and severity of future claims is usually unknown, counsel
can assign them a high estimate and thus increase the estimated class recovery-with the
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systematic about present versus future claimants that would jus-
tify banning unitary representation out of hand.
The most persuasive reason for rejecting unitary representa-
tion in Amchem was the claim that counsel was biased in favor of
present claimants."3 The lawyers who negotiated the settlement
also had many individual clients. Arguably, they had an interest
in favoring their inventory cases over cases that had not yet been
filed, and for which they would not necessarily have a claim to an
attorneys' fee. It is principally this feature that justifies the re-
sult in Amchem and the objections in the commentaries. 4 But
this is not intrinsic to all class actions involving present and fu-
ture claims.
Application of the hypothetical consent approach to the pre-
sent/future claimant problem suggests the following. First, if
class counsel has an incentive to favor present over future claim-
ants, she may find it advantageous to accept a lower result for
the class as a whole in exchange for generous compensation for
present claimants. The reasonable plaintiff would have a reason
to withhold consent to unitary representation in such a case. Sec-
ond, risk aversion can be important in some contexts, most im-
portantly in mass tort cases such as Amchem. People who became
ill from asbestos exposure may suffer devastating health conse-
quences. Members of the class, accordingly, can be presumed to
be risk averse to the possibility that their recoveries will differ
significantly from a fair estimate of the strength of their cases.
Unitary representation probably enhances the probability of error
in compensation, since counsel has an incentive to negotiate for a
global settlement that may not include fine-tuned adjustments
for differences in individual cases. The risk of inaccurate alloca-
tion of the settlement proceeds is increased if class counsel has an
incentive to favor present over future claimants. Finally, while
the divide between present and future claimants is not always
sharply demarcated, it is at least reasonably capable of identifica-
tion. Because the class splits naturally into two groups, the con-
flict of interest could be cured at relatively low cost, especially if
it is identified and remedied early. For these reasons, the result
in Amchem was probably correct although the analysis was mud-
consequence that future claimants who do come forward may receive larger compensation
that would be warranted by the objective features of their claims.See Amchem, 521 US at 612.
1o4 See, for example, Issacharoff, 30 UC Davis L Rev at 832 (cited in note 4) (recom-
mending a "strong presumption" against certification of any such case).
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dled. However, in other cases involving present and future claim-
ants, especially small-claim consumer class actions, the factors
identified above might lead the reasonable plaintiff to consent to
unitary representation.
5. Uncompensated releases and negative outcomes.
Some settlements extinguish claims of some class members
without obtaining any benefit for them. An example is Berger v
Compaq Computer Corp,"' a recent Fifth Circuit securities fraud
case. The defendant had allegedly inflated its financial position.
When the truth came out, its stock fell from $9.75 to $6.15. The
class included "early" purchasers who paid less than $6.15, and
"late" purchasers who paid more. The proposed settlement
adopted a recessionary measure of damages. Under this ap-
proach, the late purchasers received cash while the early pur-
chasers received nothing. °6 Since early purchasers had paid less
than the trading value of the stock after the truth was revealed,
rescission would provide no relief because they could cover in the
market. At the same time, they would lose the right to litigate
their claims individually. An alternative measure of damages, the
out-of-pocket approach, would have potentially provided early
purchasers with relief, since it would have been based on the dif-
ference between what they paid and what the stock was worth at
the date of purchase. The choice between the two measures of
damages presented a potential intra-class conflict. Although the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the conflict was illusory under the
particular facts of the case,"0 7 its opinion hinted that such differ-
ences could, in a different case, be the basis for challenging a set-
tlement. The Fifth Circuit's suspicion about settlements that ex-
tinguish some claims without compensation is mirrored in other
decisions.'
A closely related situation arises when the settlement pur-
ports to release nonclass claims-claims of some class members
that were not included in the class action complaint. The leading
'05 257 F3d 475 (5th Cir 2001).
' Id at 477.
117 The court held that the early purchasers were subject to the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, and thus were limited to recessionary damages. See id at 482.
" See, for example, Amchem, 521 US at 627 (criticizing settlement for extinguishing
loss-of-consortium and other claims, even if recognized by otherwise-applicable law); Rey-
nolds v Beneficial National Bank, 288 F3d 277, 284 (7th Cir 2002) (noting that proposed
nationwide settlement purported to release valuable claims of Texas class members for no
consideration).
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case is National Super Spuds, Inc v New York Mercantile Ex-
change."9 The class consisted of persons who purchased potato
futures whose contracts had been liquidated during the class pe-
riod. The settlement, in addition to releasing these claims, also
released nonclass claims of class members who had purchased
contracts that were not liquidated during the class period. The
court rejected the settlement on the grounds that it was unfair to
the subset of the class whose claims based on unliquidated con-
tracts were being extinguished, but who were receiving compen-
sation solely for the claims they shared with the class. " ' Although
Super Spuds dealt specifically with nonclass claims, its rationale
appears broader. The case seems to stand for the proposition that
a court should not approve a class action settlement that releases
potentially valuable claims of some class members without com-
pensation, whether or not those claims were contained in the
class action complaint."'
Some cases threaten to inflict harm that goes beyond the un-
compensated release of potentially valuable claims. In Martin v
American Medical Systems, Inc,"2 for example, the court refused
to certify a products liability class action seeking damages for
alleged defects in the defendant's penile implant device. The
court observed that, while some class members had experienced
problems with the device, most had not. The satisfied customers
might want to receive replacements as their implants wore out,
and might be unable to obtain them if the litigation resulted in
the defendant terminating production. The litigation, in other
words, threatened an outcome that would be affirmatively harm-
ful to a significant faction of the class. The court concluded that
the conflict in the goals of the litigation-dissatisfied customers
wanting damages, satisfied customers wanting the device to be
available in the future-was sufficiently acute as to preclude cer-
tification."'
Class litigation can also harm plaintiffs when some benefit
from a contract and want to enforce it, while others are harmed
by the contract and want to invalidate it. Hansberry v Lee"4 is
illustrative. The contract in question was a racially restrictive
660 F2d 9 (2d Cir 1981).
Id at 16.
. See id at 20. See also In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 2002 WL 1758897,
*6 (2d Cir) (criticizing settlement for releasing foreign claims without compensation).
.2 1995 US Dist LEXIS 22169 (S D Ind).
.. Id at *24.
. 311 US 32 (1940).
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covenant. Some class members wished to enforce the covenant,
thus preventing sales of property to African-Americans; others
wished to have the right to sell their property free of the cove-
nant."5 In earlier litigation brought in the nature of a class ac-
tion, the court had upheld the validity of the covenant and de-
clared that it ran with the land. The class included all property
owners, including those who would benefit from the enforceability
of the covenant and those who would benefit if the covenant were
nullified."6 The Court pointed to this conflict as a reason why the
dissenting class members were not adequately represented in the
prior litigation and therefore could not be bound by the judg-
ment.
11 7
As the Hansberry case illustrates, the problem of negative
outcomes can be acute in actions seeking injunctive or other equi-
table relief."8 Consider Retired Chicago Police Association v City
of Chicago,"9 a challenge to a change in health care coverage for
retired city employees. It turned out that some members of the
class had actually benefited from the change, and stood to be
harmed if the relief sought in the class action were granted-a
conflict that provided one reason for refusing certification.' 20 The
problem can also arise in public interest litigation. A leading case
is Fiandaca v Cunningham.2' Public interest attorneys brought
actions on behalf of two classes of persons in state institutions:
female prison inmates and students at Laconia State School, a
home for mentally retarded or physically handicapped individu-
als. The state offered to settle the prison litigation by establishing
a facility at Laconia School, which class counsel rejected on the
". Id at 38.
11 Id.
'" Id at 44.
IS See, for example, Scardelletti v Debarr, 265 F3d 195, 199 (4th Cir 2001), revd on
other grounds, 536 US 1 (2002) (challenging to cost-of-living pension plan adjustment
which, if successful, would help current workers and hurt retired workers); Mayfield v
Dalton, 109 F3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir 1997) (noting intra-class conflict between service
personnel who objected to supplying DNA samples to the government and others who
approved of the policy); Alston v Virginia High School League, Inc, 184 FRD 574, 579 (W D
Va 1999) (plaintiff seeking injunction against rescheduling sports events could not repre-
sent the class when a majority of the class approved of the revised schedule and would
experience inconvenience if it were changed); Cox v USX Corp, 1990 US Dist LEXIS
18289, *13 (N D Ala) (refusing to certify equitable portion of class action challenging col-
lective bargaining agreement when some class members benefited from the agreement
and would be harmed by the proposed relief).
7 F3d 584 (7th Cir 1993).
Id at 604.
12' 827 F2d 825 (1st Cir 1987).
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ground that they did not want to prejudice the interests of their
clients in the second case. The First Circuit held that counsel
faced a disqualifying conflict because they were forced to trade off
the interests of one set of clients against another.122 Although the
Fiandaca case involved separate class actions, the principle of the
case would obviously apply if counsel had attempted to represent
both groups in a single class.
The hypothetical consent approach supports the results in
these uncompensated release or negative outcome cases. When
some class members receive no compensation for releasing valu-
able rights, the reasonable inference is that class counsel has
failed to obtain the best possible result for the class as a whole.
Similarly, if some class members receive no benefit for releasing
valuable claims, it is probable that class counsel have not allo-
cated the benefits of the litigation accurately. Risk aversion is
likely to be significant, particularly when the case generates a
negative outcome for some class members. While people may be
tolerant of risk when the question is how much consideration
they will receive from class litigation, they are likely to be more
concerned when the outcome of the litigation may actually harm
them. Negative outcome cases also tend to involve dignitary or
ideological interests as to which class members may be risk
averse. The weight of these factors suggests that courts should
insist on cogent justifications before approving any arrangement
involving uncompensated releases or negative outcomes for a por-
tion of the class.
B. Absent Class Members and Class Counsel
We turn now to another category of conflict in class actions:
cases in which the interests of class counsel deviate from those of
the class as a whole. These conflicts, like those discussed in the
previous Part, are conflicts of interest rather than conflicts of
opinion. They differ from intra-class conflicts, however, in that
they are both all-encompassing and also unavoidable.23
1. Compensation of counsel.
As in all litigation, lawyers in class actions have an interest
in obtaining a fee. Unless they are strongly motivated by altruis-
r2 Id at 830-31.
" The existence of a significant conflict in this area is recognized by many commenta-
tors. See, for example, Downs, 73 Neb L Rev at 648 (cited in note 4).
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tic, ethical, or ideological concerns, they prefer to obtain as large
a fee as possible. The lawyer's interest in the fee creates a struc-
tural conflict with the class.'24 Courts therefore permit class rep-
resentation to go forward, but monitor counsel to ensure that the
lawyer's interest in the fee does not adversely affect the quality of
the representation. If a case goes to judgment, the court can scru-
tinize the reasonableness of the fee when it awards compensation
to counsel.
The hypothetical consent approach suggests the following on
the matter of fees. In money damages cases, the reasonable plain-
tiff would prefer that counsel be compensated under the percent-
age-of-recovery method. Because this method aligns the attor-
ney's interests with those of the class, the percentage approach
creates an incentive for counsel to generate the best recovery for
the class-an advantage not shared by the alternative lodestar
method, which calculates the fee by multiplying the reasonable
hours expended by class counsel by the reasonable hourly rate
and then adjusts this "lodestar" figure for various factors. 2 ' How-
ever, the reasonable plaintiff will also be aware that the percent-
age method creates perverse incentives of its own, including pre-
mature settlements,' 6 excessive focus on monetary relief,2 7 collu-
sive settlements,'28 "reverse auctions, ' and devices to exaggeratethe value received by the class-for example, through the use of
" At least this is true if the lawyer does not take over the full economic risks and
rewards of the case. See Macey and Miller, 58 U Chi L Rev at 105-07 (cited in note 3)
(discussing possibility of auctioning class cases).
"' This benefit of the percentage fee over the lodestar is widely recognized in the lit-
erature. See, for example, Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 724 (cited in note 3); Macey and
Miller, 58 U Chi L Rev at 50 (cited in note 3); Charles Silver, Due Process and the Lodestar
Method: You Can't Get There from Here, 74 Tulane L Rev 1809, 1810-19 (2000). The per-
centage method is now overwhelmingly favored in courts, see Shaw v Toshiba American
Information Systems, Inc, 91 F Supp 2d 942, 962 (E D Tex 2000), although many jurisdic-
tions continue to permit the use of the lodestar or generalized judicial discretion as alter-
natives. See Geoffrey P. Miller and Lori S. Singer, Non-Pecuniary Class Action Settle-
ments, 60 L & Contemp Probs 97, 110 (1997).
' See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsi-
dies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U Pa L Rev
2119, 2177-78 (2000) ("Percentage of the fund rule as customarily calculated may not
provide sufficient incentive for lawyers to represent zealously.").
See id at 2119.
See Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1373-1384 (cited in note 4); Koniak, 80 Cornell L
Rev at 1047-48 (cited in note 4) (describing alleged collusion in asbestos settlement).
'"' The term refers to a process in which the defendant effectively sells the settlement
to the low-bidding attorney. See Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1354, 1371-73 (cited in note 4);
Bruce Hay and David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Ac-
tions: Reality and Remedy, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 1377, 1389-91 (2000).
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inappropriately designed "coupon" settlements 130 or funds that
revert to the defendant if unclaimed. 3' To manage these risks,
the reasonable plaintiff might in some circumstances prefer lead
counsel rights to be auctioned to a qualified attorney willing to
take the case for the lowest percentage fee. 3' Given the pervasive
concerns about the loyalty of class counsel with respect to fees,
the reasonable plaintiff would want the trial court to rigorously
scrutinize fee awards sought in any class action settlement.
When fees are determined by the lodestar method-as in
some private damages class actions and nearly all cases brought
under statutes with fee-shifting provisions 33-the conflict be-
tween counsel and the class takes a different form. Counsel's pe-
cuniary interest here is to maximize the hours expended on suc-
cessful cases. Because the fee will be paid by the defendant, such
excessive litigation, while inefficient for society, is not necessarily
a cost for the class. In fact, if class counsel can present a realistic
threat that they will run up the fees, this can benefit the class
because it might induce the defendant to offer more in settle-
ment.
'' On coupon settlements, see Severin Borenstein, Settling for Coupons: Discount
Contracts as Compensation and Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits, 39 J L & Econ 379
(1996); Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Anti-
trust and Consumer Litigation, 49 UCLA L Rev 991 (2002); Miller and Singer, 60 L &
Contemp Probs at 102 (cited in note 125); Note, In-Kind Class Action Settlements, 109
Harv L Rev 810 (1996).
"' Miller and Singer, 60 L & Contemp Probs at 98-99 (cited in note 125); Boeing v Van
Gemert, 444 US 472, 474 (1980) (holding that coupon holders are the equitable owners of a
recovery, whether or not they use the coupon).
" Lead counsel auctions have recently come under heavy criticism, see Jill Fisch,
Lawyers On The Auction Block: Evaluating The Selection Of Class Counsel By Auction,
102 Colum L Rev 650, 652 (2002) (noting auctions "don't address agency problems," and
'reduce accountability" for counsel); Third Circuit Task Force Report on the Selection of
Class Counsel, 208 FRD 340, 349 (2002) (criticizing auctions as exacerbating rather than
mitigating agency costs); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Questionable Case for Using Auctions
to Select Lead Counsel, 80 Wash U L Q 889 (2002) (criticizing lead counsel auctions as
under-compensating counsel and thereby quality of class representation). Criticism of lead
counsel auctions is directed most forcibly at the use of this device in litigation under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. See In re Cavanaugh, 306 F3d 726, 731-32 (9th
Cir 2002) (holding that court-mandated lead counsel auctions are not generally permissi-
ble in litigation under the PSLRA); In re Cendant Corporation Litigation, 264 F3d 201,
277 (3rd Cir 2001). However, auctions continue to offer a promising method for selecting
counsel in appropriate cases.
" A fee-shifting statute authorizes courts to require defendant to pay the attorneys
fees of prevailing plaintiffs. See, for example, 42 USC § 6972(e) (in actions under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, court "may award the costs of litigation (including reasonable attor-
ney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party whenever
the court determines such an award is appropriate").
617
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
The lodestar approach is not necessarily beneficial for the
class, however. As noted already, it lacks the percentage fee's
built-in incentive to maximize class recovery. As long as the at-
torney gets enough for the class to be considered a "prevailing
party" (or persuades the defendant to pay a fee as part of a set-
tlement), counsel will be compensated even if the recovery is less
than could have been achieved with more vigorous or competent
representation. Moreover, although the risk of collusive settle-
ments is limited by the need for counsel to justify the fee with
time sheets or other evidence, several strategies are available
under which class counsel can trade off a higher fee for reduced
recovery for the class. The defendant may agree to a "clear sail-
ing" provision under which it will not object to a fee award up to a
specified amount."' Courts are unlikely to exercise strict scrutiny
over fee requests that fall within the limits of such an agreement.
The defendant and class counsel may also agree to a settlement
and then conduct meaningless depositions in order to justify a
fee. In light of the deficiencies and risks of the lodestar method,
the reasonable plaintiff would want the court to exercise scrutiny
over lodestar fees that is equally as strict as the applicable review
in percentage-of-recovery cases.
Public interest litigation presents somewhat different prob-
lems. To the extent that public interest attorneys are motivated
by financial objectives, they are subject to the fee conflicts just
described. But many public interest attorneys would deny that
financial remuneration is their primary objective. The lack of a
controlling pecuniary motive does not eliminate the potential for
conflict, however. Public interest attorneys receive compensation
in the form of the psychic reward that accompanies a feeling of
promoting the good of society. This public interest motivation
may induce counsel to act out of political or ideological beliefs
that can come into conflict with the interests of the class. The
reasonable plaintiff will prefer that counsel not seek to further
her own political or ideological objectives if the outcome is not
optimal for the class. Moreover, because the issues being litigated
are often fundamental, the class (and therefore the reasonable
plaintiff) is likely to be risk averse as to outcomes, exacerbating
the potential harm of ideological representation. The reasonable
plaintiff under the hypothetical consent test would not want to
unduly hamper public interest representation, but would want
" See, for example, Malchman v Davis, 761 F2d 893, 905 (2d Cir 1985).
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the court to exercise careful review over class counsel's conduct of
the litigation in order to ensure that the objectives being sought
are truly those of the class.
2. Collateral interests of counsel.
Aside from the matter of compensation, there are a variety of
other ways in which class counsel's personal interests may come
into conflict with the interests of the class. In some cases, for ex-
ample, counsel represents parties in parallel litigation. In such a
situation, the lawyer's incentives in representing the class may
be skewed by her economic interest in the other case.135 Attorneys
have also sought to act as their own class representative or by
having one of their partners or associates do so. Such dual ser-
vice-as attorney and as named plaintiff--can raise concerns be-
cause the attorney's interest, as counsel, in receiving a fee may
trump her interest as class representative in obtaining the larg-
est possible recovery for the class.'36 In still other cases, the loy-
alty of class counsel may be compromised by relationships with
the defendant-for example, if a defendant or potential defendant
is a client of the firm3 7 or if the defendant retains class counsel
for future services."8 In each of these situations, the hypothetical
consent approach would ask whether the arrangement threatens
either to reduce the total class recovery or to introduce error in
the allocation of the proceeds, and asks further whether a cura-
tive order would be feasible. The generally hostile attitude of
3 Courts have sometimes found this situation to be problematic. See, for example,
Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp, 527 US 815, 856 (1999); Jackshaw Pontiac, Inc v Cleveland Press
Publishing Co, 102 FRD 183, 192 (N D Ohio 1984); Sullivan v Chase Investment Services
of Boston, 79 FRD 246, 258 (N D Ca 1978). In other cases, however, parallel litigation was
not enough to defeat representation. See, for example, Sheftelman v Jones, 667 F Supp
859, 865 (N D Ga 1987) (tentative settlement had been reached in parallel litigation);
Anderson v Bank of the South, NA, 118 FRD 136, 149 (M D Fla 1987) (noting that conflict
is too speculative).
1" See generally Keith Fleischman and U. Seth Ottensoser, Ethical Issues Concerning
Non-Federal Question Class Action Litigation, 635 PLI/Lit 199, 201-03 (2000). Most courts
have disapproved of this practice, in part on conflict of interest grounds. See, for example,
Zylstra v Safeway Stores, Inc, 578 F2d 102, 104 (5th Cir 1978) (noting that such attorneys
cannot serve with the same "unswerving devotion"); Turoff v May Co, 531 F2d 1357, 1360
(6th Cir 1976) (noting that the named plaintiffs were three members of counsel and wife of
a participating attorney); Kramer v Scientific Control Corp, 534 F2d 1085, 1093 (3d Cir
1976) (deciding that even those sharing office space with counsel can be disqualified).
"' See Guenther v Pacific Telecom, Inc, 123 FRD 341, 345 (D Or 1987) (stating that
court approval of settlements is not enough to shield conflicts of interest).
" See Linney v Cellular Alaska Partnership, 151 F3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir 1998) (find-
ing a lack of conflict).
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courts towards collateral interests by counsel'39 can be under-
stood, within the framework of the hypothetical consent ap-
proach, as reflecting concern that the attorney will not act as a
good agent for the class coupled with awareness that disqualifica-
tion of counsel is a feasible remedy under the circumstances of
the particular case. In one respect, however, the judicial response
appears difficult to reconcile with the hypothetical consent ap-
proach. Given the minimal nature of the representative plaintiff's
role, it is not clear that combining the roles of named plaintiff
and class counsel would have a discernible negative effect. Judi-
cial repudiation of this practice may reflect an understandable
but unrealistic wish to force the square peg of class actions into
the round hole of ordinary litigation, but does not appear justifi-
able under the hypothetical consent approach.
3. Switching sides.
In unusual cases, class counsel can switch sides and chal-
lenge a settlement negotiated by other attorneys for the class.
Typically, this happens after co-counsel have a falling out and
one leaves the consortium. In such a case, counsel's opposition to
the settlement may be challenged on the ground that she is in a
position of direct conflict with her former client (the class). In In
re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,"4 the Second Cir-
cuit outlined factors for trial courts to consider in this situation.
Recognizing that the rules of ethics could not be "mechanically"
applied, the court called for a "balancing of the interests of the
various groups of class members and of the interest of the public
and the court in achieving a just and expeditious resolution of the
dispute."' The court outlined factors for the trial court to con-
sider in performing such a balancing: the "amount and nature of
the information that has been proffered to the attorney, its avail-
ability elsewhere, its importance to the question at issue, such as
settlement, as well as actual prejudice that may flow from that
information."' In addition, the Second Circuit directed trial
courts to consider "the costs to the class members of requiring
them to obtain new counsel, taking into account such factors as
"9 See Zylstra, 578 2d 102; Turoff, 531 F2d 1357; Kramer, 534 F2d 1085.
..0 In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 800 F2d 14, 18-19 (2d Cir 1986).
See also Lazy Oil Co v Witco Corp, 166 F3d 581, 584 (3d Cir 1999).
800 F2d at 19.
Id at 19, citing In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, 748 F2d 157, 165 (3d Cir
1984) (Adams concurring).
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the nature and value of the claim they are presenting, the ease
with which they could obtain new counsel, the factual and legal
complexity of the litigation, and the time that would be needed
for new counsel to familiarize himself with all that has gone be-
fore. ,
143
The hypothetical consent approach suggests a simpler analy-
sis, but one generally consistent with the Second Circuit's ap-
proach. When class counsel switches sides, the conflict presented
is often one of opinion rather than interest. The dissenting attor-
ney challenges the proposed settlement because she believes it to
be inadequate, not because she represents a subset of the class
that is differentially harmed. Conflicts of opinion, while not ir-
relevant, are generally less troublesome than conflicts of interest,
and therefore provide a less compelling case against continuing
representation. Even if the attorney purports to represent a
group within the class with interests that are adverse to the in-
terests of the class; moreover, the dissenting opinion may provide
the court with information. While the reasons for the dissenting
lawyer's switch may cast doubt on her impartiality, the court will
be aware of this fact and can apply an appropriate discount. At
the same time, because the dissenting lawyer has previously rep-
resented the class, she may be able to provide information that is
of real value in assessing the fairness of the settlement. The rea-
sonable plaintiff would generally prefer this information to come
out. While a curative order would be simple-the court merely
disqualifies the dissenting attorney-such a remedy would pro-
vide little value and could be harmful. Accordingly, the hypo-
thetical consent approach suggests that an attorney who previ-
ously acted for the class should ordinarily be allowed to lodge an
objection to the settlement.'"
C. Absent Class Members and the Representative Plaintiff
Sometimes it is the representative plaintiff, rather than class
counsel, who has interests that deviate from the interests of the
class.
143 Id.
'14 The court could take appropriate action to ensure that the attorney does not dis-
close privileged information.
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1. Unique characteristics of the representative plaintiff
It is often the case that the proposed representative plaintiff
has features that differ from the class as a whole which may
place this individual in some degree of tension or conflict with
other class members. These problems are dealt with, at the certi-
fication phase, through the inquiries as to whether the named
plaintiff is "typical" of the class and whether the named plaintiff
will "adequately" represent the class.'45 Acting in the ironic role of
putative champions for the class, defendants frequently seek to
disqualify the named plaintiff on these grounds.
The hypothetical consent requirement would not ordinarily
mandate disqualification of representative plaintiffs because of
such unique features. It will often be difficult to locate a repre-
sentative plaintiff who mirrors the class in every respect. Indi-
vidual features are nearly inevitable in class litigation. If courts
routinely disqualified the named plaintiff because of idiosyncratic
facts, class action litigation would hardly exist. Because the rea-
sonable plaintiff in the hypothetical consent analysis wants to
maximize class recovery, the practical necessity for accepting a
less than ideal prototype will ordinarily be a salient considera-
tion. Further, because the named plaintiff typically exercises only
minimal control over the litigation (at least in large scale, small
claim cases), unique features of the class representative's per-
sonal situation will not ordinarily pose dangers. It is the attor-
ney's interest that counts; and if the attorney is motivated to ob-
tain the largest possible recovery for the class and to ensure that
class members receive a reasonably accurate share of the pro-
ceeds, the individual incentives of the representative plaintiff
make little difference.
146
Consistent with this analysis, courts are forgiving of this type
of conflict.'47 Occasionally, however, they fall prey to a formalism
See FRCP 23.
'"' The situation may be different in securities fraud cases in light of the heightened
role contemplated for the representative plaintiff under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act. 15 USCS § 78u-4(a)(2)(A) (2000).
147 See, for example, Smith v Texaco, Inc, 263 F3d 394, 406 (5th Cir 2001) (noting that
named plaintiff's claims were typical notwithstanding differences with members of the
class); Mullen v Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F3d 620, 625 (5th Cir 1999) (stating that
the typicality test is "not demanding"). The forgiving approach to typicality is not univer-
sal, however. Courts occasionally refuse to certify classes when they detect unique de-
fenses not shared by the class or the absence of defenses that can be asserted against the
class. See, for example, Zenith Laboratories, Inc v Carter Wallace, 530 F2d 508, 512 (3d
Cir 1976).
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that generates questionable results. An example is Morlan v Uni-
versal Guaranty Life Insurance Co.4' The putative class represen-
tative became insolvent and a trustee was appointed. The court
held that the trustee was not a good class representative because
taking on the burdens of representing the class was inconsistent
with the fiduciary duties owed to creditors.'49 While this opinion
identifies a formal conflict between the named plaintiff and the
class, the court's decision to exclude the representative appears
unwarranted. The trustee's loyalty to the creditors was unlikely
to impair his adequacy as class representative because there was
no real conflict between the sides. The better view is that being a
trustee in bankruptcy does not automatically disable a party from
acting as class representative.5 '
2. Disavowal of the action by class members.
In some cases, the court becomes aware that absent class
members disagree with the class representatives about the strat-
egy or objectives of the litigation. Such dissent can occur at the
certification phase, at settlement, or at any other time during the
litigation. Particularly in "non-opt-out" actions, where class
members do not have an exit option, widespread expressions of
dissatisfaction among class members may provoke judicial in-
quiry.
The hypothetical consent approach would not, per se, require
curative action even if large numbers of class members dissent.
The conflict involved here is one of opinion rather than interest,
and accordingly poses a lower threat to the class as a whole.
However, widespread dissent among class members can signal
possible problems. Dissent could indicate, for example, that class
counsel has failed or is likely to fail to obtain the best possible
result for the class. Dissatisfaction could also indicate that coun-
sel has litigated the case to favor one group over another-thus
increasing the risk that individual recoveries will deviate from a
reasonable estimate of claim value. Thus, the reasonable plaintiff
"s 298 F3d 609 (7th Cir 2002).
149 Id at 619.
50 See, for example, Shamberg v Ahlstrom, 111 FRD 689, 694 (D NJ 1986) (leaving
discretion to trustees in whether to proceed); Clark v Cameron-Brown Co, 72 FRD 48, 54-
55 (M D NC 1976) (taking into account the numerous checks upon the duties of a trustee).
The permissibility of representation by fiduciaries is assumed under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, which encourages institutional investors to act as lead plaintiffs.
See Geoffrey P. Miller, Payment of Expenses in Securities Class Actions: Ethical Dilem-
mas, Class Counsel and Congressional Intent (2003).
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would certainly want the court to investigate the causes of the
dissent and the arguments put forth by the dissenters' represen-
tatives. However, the reasonable plaintiff would not necessarily
want the court to do anything as a result of the inquiry. Because
differences of opinion over how a case should be handled are to be
expected in large scale litigation,"' the presence of dissent is not
in itself evidence that the case is being mishandled. Moreover,
the curative options available to the court are likely to be limited.
If the dissent is fomented by an attorney who wishes to wrest the
case from lead counsel, the "cure"--which would presumably be
to transfer lead counsel rights to the dissenters' attorney-might
be worse than the disease. Thus, the hypothetical consent ap-
proach suggests that the proper role for the court when faced
with dissent in the class is to make an inquiry, hold a hearing if
necessary, and then evaluate whether taking curative action
would, all things considered, make the class as a whole better off.
In the usual case, it is likely that the court would conclude that
intra-class dissent, in itself, is not a sufficient basis for change.15
D. Class Counsel and Representative Plaintiff
In some cases, the named plaintiff becomes dissatisfied with
representation by the class attorney and thereafter objects to a
settlement or seeks substitution of counsel. Lazy Oil Co v Witco
Corp 53 is illustrative. The class consisted of sellers of oil, includ-
ing producers and investors who purchased for resale. Landers, a
producer, originally served as a representative plaintiff but be-
1 See, for example, Horton v Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F2d 470,
486 (5th Cir 1982) (denying certification of large class "when it is obvious that a real pos-
sibility of antagonism exists"); Wyatt by and through Rawlins v Poundstone, 169 FRD 155,
161 (M D Ala 1995) ("[1I]t would be impossible to obtain and maintain 100% agreement
within the class.").
"2 The case law is in general agreement. See Cotton v Hinton, 559 F2d 1326, 1333 (5th
Cir 1977) (settlement approved over objection of counsel claiming to represent almost half
the class); Bryan v Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, 494 F2d 799, 803 (3d Cir 1974) (approving a
settlement over objections by more than a fifth of the class). However, if dissent is suffi-
ciently vehement, the court may decide to act. See, for example, East Texas Motor Freight
System, Inc v Rodriguez, 431 US 395, 405 (1977) (finding class certification not proper
when a majority of the class members had rejected the relief sought by the named plain-
tiffs); Davis v Roadway Express, Inc, 590 F2d 140, 144 (5th Cir 1979) (noting an "over-
whelming [vote of] opposition"); Peterson v Oklahoma City Housing Authority, 545 F2d
1270, 1273 (10th Cir 1976) (noting opposition by many class members). But even majority
opposition might not be enough to derail a settlement if class members enjoy the right to
opt out. See County of Suffolk v Long Island Lighting Co, 907 F2d 1295, 1325 (2d Cir
1990).
' 166 F3d 581 (3d Cir 1999).
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came disaffected with counsel and appeared in court to oppose
the settlement and request a subclass.' How should the court
treat this kind of conflict of interest?
The hypothetical consent approach suggests that conflict be-
tween class counsel and the representative plaintiff over the con-
duct of the litigation, without more, should not ordinarily be the
basis for disqualification."' This is a conflict of opinion rather
than interest, and accordingly is less problematic than conflicts
reflecting structural fissures in the class. There could be many
causes for the named plaintiff's dissatisfaction-personal animus,
resentment at not being consulted, influence of dissenting attor-
neys, demands for compensation, or differences of opinion on sub-
stance or strategy. Most of these reasons do not threaten the
class. Because of the minimal role typically played by the class
representative, there is little danger that differences between the
named plaintiff and the class counsel will adversely affect coun-
sel's incentives or ability to obtain the best outcome for the class.
Moreover, because the class representative is rarely an attorney
and typically knows much less about the case than counsel, the
reasonable plaintiff would tend to favor the views of counsel in
the event of differences of opinion between the two. Remedial
considerations also play a role: by the time disputes between the
representative plaintiff and counsel boil over, the case is likely to
be well advanced, making disqualification or replacement of
counsel generally undesirable. Nonetheless, since there is a
chance, albeit usually a small one, that the representative plain-
tiff's concerns are genuine and well founded, the reasonable
plaintiff would want the court to hear and consider the com-
plaints if the representative plaintiff becomes dissatisfied enough
to bring a disagreement to the court's attention.
E. Class Counsel and Class Counsel
Class actions are frequently litigated by loose affiliations of
plaintiffs' firms. To achieve a modicum of order and coherence,
" In addition to objecting to counsel's representation of the claim as a whole, the class
representative complained that producers had suffered unique injuries not shared by
investors. However, the trial court, in a decision upheld by the Third Circuit, rejected
these claims, concluding that the purported distinction between producers and investors
was unsupported by the facts and irrelevant to the class claims, and that Landers's motion
for a subclass came too late. Id at 588.
" See, for example, Maywalt v Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co, 155 FRD 494, 497 (S
D NY 1994), affd 67 F3d 1072 (2d Cir 1995) (refusing request by four of five representative
plaintiffs to remove class counsel).
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the court typically appoints a lead counsel or a steering commit-
tee that distributes the work among the plaintiffs' attorneys and
effectively controls the allocation of the fee."56 Even if lead counsel
is appointed, however, there is nothing to stop an attorney from
refusing to join the consortium, or from breaking away and seek-
ing to represent her client individually. The key fissure points are
when the lawyers file a motion for appointment of lead counsel-
which may split the attorneys into competing camps' 5 -- and set-
tlement, when the allocation of the spoils is determined and dis-
appointed attorneys can exercise leverage by holding up pay-
ment.'
The hypothetical consent approach would suggest that con-
flicts between class counsel should only rarely be grounds for up-
setting existing arrangements. Such conflicts are likely to reflect
factors having nothing to do with the litigation-prior dealings,
personal animosities and jealousies, or raw struggles for wealth
or power. Some disputes have greater relevance. For example,
disagreements over how a case should be litigated, if brought to
the attention of the court, may materially assist the trial judge in
protecting the class. Challenges to settlements can expose weak-
nesses or insufficiencies in the compromise. And because the dis-
senting attorney is presumably familiar with the case, she will be
well positioned to provide the court with reliable information. On
the other hand, even when disputes among counsel go to matters
that would be of concern to the reasonable plaintiff, they will tend
to reflect only conflicts of opinion rather than conflicts of interest
within the class. Moreover, aside from the settlement context,
where the court always has the option to reject the proposal, the
judge may face difficulties in crafting a curative order even when
conflicts between plaintiffs' attorneys threaten to impair class
interests.
F. Representative Plaintiff and Representative Plaintiff
A final category of conflict is the situation where one or more
of the representative plaintiffs break away and "become adverse
See Fisch, 102 Colum L Rev at 655 (cited in note 132).See, for example, In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 131 FRD 688, 697 (N D Cal
1990) (selecting lead counsel on the basis of a bidding process between attorneys).
75 This leverage is enhanced by the Supreme Court's recent holding that federal court
objectors have the right to appeal settlement approvals. Devlin v Scardelletti, 536 US 1, 3
(2002).
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parties to the remaining class representatives." '59 The borders of
this category are indistinct because, when the class representa-
tive breaks away, she not only becomes adverse to the other class
representatives, but also to others in the class. 6' Typically, also,
the apparent dispute between the dissenting plaintiff and the
other representative plaintiffs disguises (sometimes only thinly) a
dispute between class counsel and class counsel, or between class
counsel and an attorney who wishes to become class counsel. Ob-
jections to settlements are the classic milieu for this form of con-
flict.16' The presence of an objecting plaintiff may raise either (or
both) a conflict of opinion or a conflict of interest. The objector
may share the characteristics of the class as a whole, and thus
possess no cognizable conflict of interest, but may simply object to
the settlement on the grounds that it is not adequate. This is a
conflict of opinion. In other cases, the objector may claim to rep-
resent a structural element of the class that has not been treated
fairly in the settlement, thus claiming a conflict of interest as
well.
The hypothetical consent approach suggests the following
about how courts should deal with objectors. Because the reason-
able plaintiff knows the general features of class action litigation,
she will understand that objectors come in two flavors. One type
of objectors act as good faith auditors of the settlement.6 2 They
provide potentially useful information about the quality of class
representation and the value of the relief obtained 6 -
information that may not be forthcoming from counsel whose in-
terest at this stage is to promote the settlement. The other type of
objectors seek to hold up the settlement in order to obtain a lu-
crative commission. These are sokaiya objectors (named after
shadowy figures in Japan who specialize in disrupting sharehold-
Lazy Oil, 166 F3d at 589.
16 As the court observed in Lazy Oil, the adversity between the dissenting representa-
tive plaintiff and the other representatives also equates to a conflict with the "rest of the
class." Id.
,' See, for example, Isby v Bayh, 75 F3d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir 1996) (settlement ap-
proved over objections of twenty-six out of sixty-eight responding class members); Van
Horn v Trickey, 840 F2d 604, 606 (8th Cir 1988) (approving a settlement despite objections
from 45 percent of class). For a comprehensive analysis of class action objectors, see Ed-
ward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors,
2003 U Chi Legal F 403.
6 See Robert Gerard and Scott A. Johnson, The Role of the Objector in Class Action
Settlements-A Case Study of the General Motors Truck "Side Saddle" Fuel Tank Litiga-
tion, 31 Loyola LA L Rev 409 (1998); In re General Motors Corp Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Product Liability Litigation, 55 F3d 768, 803 (3d Cir 1995).
"6 See Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 714 n 121 (cited in note 3).
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ers' meetings).' 64 If the reasonable plaintiff could sort between
these types, there would be no problem: public spirited objectors
would receive a serious hearing and potentially obtain relief for
the class and hold-up objectors would be rejected out of hand. The
problem is that it is difficult to make this distinction. Objectors
do not come into court wearing the black hats of spaghetti west-
ern desperados. All objectors describe themselves as public spir-
ited champions of class interests. Moreover, even if an objector
has a pecuniary interest in holding up a settlement, she may still
identify a problem that is worthy of judicial consideration. Thus,
the reasonable plaintiff would want the court to listen to the ob-
jectors, carefully evaluate their arguments, and compensate them
with some type of fee if the objector has presented information of
real and substantial value. On the other hand, if an objector adds
little to the court's evaluation, she should ordinarily receive no
fee.' 65 In light of the ambiguous motivations underlying objec-
tions, the court should be cautious about allowing an objector's
arguments to carry the day, but should be prepared to act if the
objector's arguments turn out to be well founded.'
IV. TIMING CONSIDERATIONS
A final note is in order about the timing of decisions under
the hypothetical consent approach. As already noted, courts ad-
dress the issue of conflicts of interest at two key stages in class
action litigation: certification and settlement.' 67 However, neither
of these is an optimal context in which to review the questions
however.
At the certification stage, the only party objecting to the al-
leged conflict of interest is likely to be the defendant. Since certi-
fication is granted prior to notice to the class, class members who
would object to certification may not even be aware that the mat-
ter is being litigated. Moreover, competing class counsel are
unlikely to object to certification because their interest is also to
obtain certification, albeit with themselves being awarded lead
" On sokaiya in Japan, see Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative
Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 Nw U L Rev 1436, 1451-53 (1994).
" See Reynolds, 288 F3d at 287-88 ("The law generally does not allow good Samari-
tans to claim a legally enforceable reward for their deeds.").
" The results of the hypothetical consent analysis are in general accord with the
cases, but might suggest that bona fide objectors be given somewhat greater attention
than has been the pattern to date. See Downs, 73 Neb L Rev at 650 (cited in note 4) (objec-
tions are "invariably overruled by judges bent on settlement").
See discussion from pp 5-7.
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counsel rights. The court is unlikely to hear from that source an
analysis of the problems that reflects the best interests of the
class as a whole. The court, accordingly, lacks the assistance of
adversarial analysis in evaluating the question. Further, at the
certification stage most conflicts will be potential rather than ac-
tual. Because the conflict has not yet become disabling, the court
may be tempted to certify the case on the theory that if the poten-
tial conflict ripens they can deal with this problem later.168 But a
"certify now, worry later" approach may not provide fully ade-
quate protection for the class, because by the time later comes,
the damage may have been done. 169 The representative plaintiff
would want the court to conduct a careful and expeditious review
of the conflicts issue and certify the class only if the conflict is
found to be manageable. However, the reasonable plaintiff would
consent to potential conflicts if the court will have a realistic abil-
ity to cure the problem if and when the problem becomes real.
At settlement, the court is likely to face great pressure to ap-
prove the deal. And approving the proposal, at this stage, may
well be in the best interests of the class, even if the counsel had a
disqualifying conflict of interest at the time the compromise was
negotiated. The risk here is that unless there is some sanction,
counsel would not be sufficiently deterred from taking on conflict-
ing responsibilities or interests to the detriment of the class. In
these circumstances, the best approach may be for the court to
approve the settlement but to find some means for sanctioning
counsel for the conflict, such as requiring counsel to pay reim-
bursement to the class 7° or awarding the class part of the pro-
posed attorneys' fee.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed a test for analysis of conflicts of
interest in class action: a conflict should be deemed impermissible
" See, for example, In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 200 FRD 297, 305 (E D
Mich 2001); Adames v Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd, 133 FRD 82, 88 (E D NY 1989) (noting that it
is "often proper to view the class action liberally at the early stages of the litigation since
the class can always be modified or divided as issues are later refined for trials"); Sol S.
Turnoff Drug Distributors, Inc v N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Indus-
trie, 51 FRD 227, 233 (E D Pa 1970) (stating the possibility that an intra-class conflict
may develop "cannot at this point justify the denial of a class action").
" See Southwestern Refining Company, Inc v Bernal, 22 SW3d 425, 435 (Tex 2000)
(rejecting strategy of easy certification subject to correction).
7 See Piambino v Bailey, 757 F2d 1112, 1146 (iith Cir 1985) (requiring plaintiffs'
counsel to reimburse the fund).
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if a reasonable plaintiff, operating under a veil of ignorance as to
his or her role in the class, would refuse consent to the arrange-
ment. This "hypothetical consent" approach substitutes for the
actual consent that is the lynchpin of conflicts of interest analysis
outside the class action setting. The hypothetical consent ap-
proach focuses attention on two key issues: whether the alleged
conflict threatens to reduce the recovery obtained by the class as
a whole, and whether it threatens to result in recoveries to indi-
vidual risk averse class members that deviate significantly from a
reasonable assessment of the value of their claims. The Article
identifies a structural typology of class action conflicts and illus-
trates how the hypothetical consent approach could resolve issues
that arise in the different settings. The hypothetical consent ap-
proach would appear to offer assistance to judges who face con-
flicts of interest issues in class action cases pending before them.
